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INTRODUCTION.
The history of the relations between Parliament and the 
Executive as regards the'conduot of foreign affairs is an 
important aspect of the diplomatic history of the nineteenth 
century. In their survey of the material,Professors Temperley 
and Penson came to the conclusion that detailed investigation 
of individual administrations was necessary to provide a de­
finite answer to the problem,^ and this thesis is an attempt 
to do this for the First Gladstone Administration.
It is generally.accepted that the year 1868 marks the 
revival of party government. It may be questioned whether 
it was really a revival or not rather an innovation, but how­
ever that may be, it is certain that this year marks a break 
in the history of Parliament. It seemed obvious that the 
1867 Reform Act was bound to affect constitutional practice, 
and for that reason the choice of this administration seemed 
likely to be profitable. The present thesis is, of course, 
concerned with only one aspect of Parliament's activity: the
part it played in the Government's conduct of the country's 
foreign policy; as will be seen, detailed study has led to
1. H, Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, A Century of Diplomatic 
Blue Books, p. X . The Parliamentary Papers referred to in 
this work and also in the present study comprise both Blue 
Books and % i t e  Papers, but for the sake of convenience the 
term Blue Book is used throughout.
the conclusion that the Parliament of 1868 was, at least, in - 
this respect, the first of the modern Parliaments.
The framework of Parliament's action is its procedure, 
and it therefore proved necessary to investigate this point 
before Parliamentary influence could be studied. Secondly, 
Parliament cannot act in matters of which it is ignorant; 
thus it became essential to determine the amount of informa­
tion available to it. But, as Erskine May says, ”it is in 
debate alone that a minority can hope to compete with a majo­
rity",! and whatever influence Parliament possessed must 
therefore be sought in the debates. This has been done by 
setting the debates on foreign affairs within the context of 
a number of the diplomatic events of the period.
Among these diplomatic events four questions obviously
stand out as being of the greatest diplomatic importance, and 
since a selection had to be made, detailed study has been con­
fined to them. They are the issues involved in the Black Sea 
and Central Asian questions, the negotiations concerning the 
Treaty of Washington, and the Franco-Prussian war. Between 
them, they provide a reasonably full picture of the inter­
relation of Government foreign policy and Parliamentary 
criticism.
The sources for this study and the use made of them are
1. May (8th ed.), 1879, p.286.
fully discussed in the bibliography. They consist of Parlia­
mentary material, Foreign Office papers, and the private corres­
pondence of the leading Ministers involved. I wish to acknow­
ledge my indebtedness to Miss A. Ramm, of Bedford College, 
London, who very kindly permitted me to see the typescript of 
her forthcoming volume. The Political Correspondence of Lord 
Granville and Mr. Gladstone (Camden Series), from which I 
obtained the references to Private Gladstone Papers in the 
British Museum, and one or.two references to the Private Gran­
ville Papers in the Public Record Office.
Chapter I, 
PARLI1MSÎÎTARY PROCEDURE,
The extent to which any elected assembly can influence 
the actions of its executive depends very largely on how far 
its forms of procedure permit it to do so, A st&dy of the 
state of Parliamentary procedure at the time of this admini­
stration is therefore the essential preliminary to a dis­
cussion of the influence of Parliament on foreign policy.
The rules of the House of Commons at this time provided seVen 
methods which might have been utilised to influence foreign 
policy. Some of these applied also to the House of Lords, 
but in general the flexibility of procedure in that House 
makes a study of the rules there of less Importance. Two of 
the seven methods were means of obtaining information, namely 
questions and motions for addresses for papers, TFhen the 
information had been obtained there were three ways open to 
the private member to raise debate. These were amendments 
to the motion for Committee of Supply, motions tabled on the 
days allotted tm private members, and debate on the address in 
answer to the Queen’s Speech at the opening of each session. 
There was another method which might have been used in this 
way, namely the debates on the holiday adjournments, but a 
study of the debates shows that this opportunity was not in
fact used for the discussion of foreign affairs in the period 
under review. Finally there was the procedure which in theory 
embodied the ultimate Parliamentary control over policy, by the 
right of refusing supply - the discussion of the Foreign Officè 
Estimates. These seven methods will be examined in turn, be­
ginning with the two designed to obtain information. ■
(a) Questions.
.The practice of putting questions to Ministers before the 
House proceeded to the business of the day was well established 
in 1868, although it was still to some extent regarded as an 
innovation and frowned upon as such. The Committee on Public 
Business of 1861 had treated it as a new development and while 
admitting that "there is convenience in this course" yet ex­
pressed the opinion that "to prevent this license degenerating 
into an abuse, it is most important that both the questions and 
answers should be as conoise as possible and not sustained by 
reasoning which might give rise to debate".^ By 1886 the 
"supplementary" had made its appearance, the question "thereby 
becoming a sort of speech and involving a great %aste of. time 
of the House".2 In 1868 the practice of putting questions was 
still confined within reasonable limita and questioners were 
liable to frequent interruption if they showed any tendency to
1# A» and P ., XI.431, qu.56.
2. Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson, in Hans., CCCIII.697.
transgress the rules and indulge in argument. This of course 
applied only to the Commons. The House of Lords always used 
a much more flexible procedure and enjoyed greater latitude as 
to the manner of asking questions. The subject matter of 
questions, with the allowance necessary because of their dif­
ferent composition, was similar in both Houses. A fairly large 
proportion of the questions on foreign affairs asked in the 
Commons concerned individual British subjects. That is, mem­
bers used this method to act on a restricted view of their 
function as representatives of their constituents, as distinct 
from their wider function of helping to mould the policy of the 
nation. %his type of question became increasingly frequent in 
later years as all branches of the Government took more and more 
.responsibility for the welfare of individual citizens, and at 
times it threatened to overrun the notice paper to the exclusion 
of other subjects. In 1868, however, at least as far as foreign 
affairs were concerned, such questions were only a proportion of 
the whole, and concerned the various issues which affected the 
interests, activities, or safety of individuals or groups of 
British subjects abroad. For instance, H.S.P^ Winterbotham 
asked for information on the case of Mr. J. Cassells who, it 
was alleged, had been expelled from Portugal on religious 
grounds.! F.S* Gorrance asked what steps had been taken to
1. Hans.. CXCIV.125.
secure the rights of British subjects in the territory of San
Juan, recently awarded to the U&S*Aê as a result of the arbi-
X
tration by the German Emperor# On an issue of mere general 
interest, many questions were asked about the welfare of Bri­
tish subjects during the siege of Paris.% Some topics which 
bear a resemblance to these turned out to have a wider diplo­
matic importance: such were the ’Tornado* case which concerned
the imprisonment of British seamen by the Spaniards,^ and the 
massacre of British subjects by Greek brigands.&
The second main group of questions when divided according 
to subject-matter, as might be expected, is concerned with 
commercial and financial questions. Information was requested 
concerning our commercial relations with China^ and France;& 
our payments under various arrangements to Greece,? Portugal,& 
and Brazil;^ the Suez C a n a l ; a n d  the annexation or purchase 
of colonial territory.!!
Finally, about half the questions on foreign affairs asked 
in the House of Commons concerned what may be called the general 
policy of the Government, that’is the state or development of
I. Hons., CCXIV.597. 2. Ibid.. CCVI.1254.
3. Ibid., CXCVI.742; CO.2109; CCI.7.
4. Ibid., CC.1730; CCI.464,1192; CCII.264.
5. Ibid., CC.1602; CCX.594; CCXIV.54#.
G. E.g., ibid.. CCVII.67,1289; CCIZ.649,1390; CCXIII.450,696. 
7. Ibid., CXCIV.1869. - 8. Ibid.. CXCYI.1243.
9. Ibid., CCXII.428.
10. Ibid^, CXCVII.1167,1664; CCXII.lOl; CCXIII.642. ,
II. Ibid., CGI.1842; CCV.657; CCVIII.556; CCXIV.597.
aBritish diplomatic relations with various, powers. The three 
major issues under this head about which questions were asked 
were Anglo-American relations and the Treaty of Washington; 
relations between France and Germany and the_Franco-Prussian 
war; and Russian activities in Central Asia. Other minor 
questions aroused the interest of the House, such as British 
relations with Spain and'Mexico, and maritime relations with 
various powers. _
Questions in the House of Lords belong mainly to the last 
category, although a few were asked about individuals and about 
such things as missionary activities. Within the limitations 
imposed by the rules governing Parliamentary questions, the 
answers, where notice had been given, were usually full and 
satisfactory, but it is obvious that the method was not very 
useful for complex or general topics, where the answer to one 
question tended to raise another, while giving the government 
no real opportunity to explain their position. This applied 
even to the House of Lords, where speakers at question time 
had far greater latitude than in the Commons.! Thus at the 
outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war Granville pleaded after 
frequent questions "that for the future it would be more con-
1. The absence of formality is illustrated by a discussion which 
took place on 22 May 1871. It is clear from the speeches 
that there was no certainty as to whether the rule that no­
tice should be given before asking a question was binding 
or not (Hans., GCVI.1101-8).
venient to your Lord^ips, and more advisable in other respects, 
that these communications should not be carried on by daily 
Questions and Answers, but that I should be permitted to make 
them to your Lordships at the fitting time".^ In fact, even 
so early in the system, Ministers found question time embarra­
ssing and were consequently extremely reticent lest they should 
be trapped into some disclosure. This point is, of course, 
important, since the Ministerial attitude to the methods of 
procedure employed greatly affected the relative usefulness of 
each method. .
(b) Addresses for Papers.
It has been stated that "the House of Commons has long 
maintained as a principle of its customary law that it is en­
titled to demand the use of every means of information which 
may seem needful, and, therefore, to call for all documents 
which it requires".2 The method by which the demand should 
be made varies according to the type of information called 
for, and the department responsible. Because of the connec­
tion of foreign policy with the royal prerogative the correct 
mode of obtaining papers relating to foreign affairs is by a 
humble address to the Crown.3 theory, this is a method
whereby either House of Parliament can compel a Ministry to
1. Hans., CCIII.1153. .
2. J.Hedlich, Procedure of the House of Commons, ii.39.
3. IMi.., pp.40-2; May (8th ed. ), pp.576-7.
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give information which it would prefer to withhold, since 
"when an address for papefs has been presented to the Crown, 
the parties who are to make the return appear to be within the 
immediate reach of an order of the House".! This element of 
pressure make^the Address of greater importance to our study 
of Parliamentary influence than any other aspect of procedure.
The fact that a paper was laid in Response to an Address, 
however, does not necessarily mean in practice that it repre­
sented successful pressure placed upon the Government by Par­
liament. A large proportion of Addresses were not debated, 
at all, and appear only as formal entried in the Journal of 
either House. It seems clear that there was a distinction, 
well understood in Parliament, between tabling a motion for an 
Address as an unopposed return and giving notice to move an: 
Address in either House. The two procedures were quite diffe­
rent and would find a place on separate parts of the Order 
Paper. ' In the former case the member desiring a return would 
discover, either privately or by means of a question in the 
House (and many instances of this mayibe adduced)^ whether the 
Government had any objection to the production of the papers 
he required. If they had not, he would move for an unopposed 
return. If an objection was raised, however, the only course 
left open to him was to give notice of a motion to be taken in
!. May (Sth ed.), p.577.
2. E.g., Hans.. CXLIII.323-9: CLV.31'; CLIX.2229-30.
I f
the time available to private members, such as on supply or 
adjournment.
The existence of this distinction is clearly demonstrated 
by an incident which took place in the House of Commons in 
1860.^ A private member, A.W. Kinglake, had given notice of 
a motion for papers relating to the question of Savoy and Nice. 
When the time-came for him to move for these papers. Lord John 
Russell rose and appealed to him to withdraw the motion, on the 
ground that it was desirable that the House should not debate 
the subject until the papers had been laid. Russell explained 
that he was quite ready to produce/the papers if Mr. Kinglake 
liked to move for them. Since the motion was an address for 
papers, and Russell asked for its withdrawal and yet assured 
Mr. Kinglake that he might move for papers, it seems clear that 
there must have been two methods and Russell wished'him to use 
the one that did not involve debate - that is, to move for the 
papers as an unopposed return.
The distinction between the two was not, perhaps, always 
strictly adhered to - this is a complication to be found in 
almost every part of Parliamentary procedure. In addition, 
both types of motion altered considerably in the course of the 
century, but the distinction must be borne in mind if the amount 
of Parliamentary pressure represented by a paper "Returned to
1. Hans... CLVI.1933.
aan Address'* is to be assessed. From the list of papers given 
in A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books it would appear that the 
number of papers laid each year increased steadily from 1813 
to 1859 and then remained fairly stable until 1914, although 
the number laid in any one administration might be greater or 
less according to the Blue Book policy of the Government.
The percentage of these papers which were laid in Response to 
Addresses, on the other hand, remained fairly uniform until 
1859 when there was a sharp rise, and after 1868 an equally 
sharp decline.
For the purpose of this discussion it will be convenient 
to take as the starting date, not 1 8 1 3 , but 1339 when the 
modern practice of distinguishing between sessional and command
numbering began;! since before that date the practice was 
complicated by the absence of regular numbering and by the 
publication of new documents in British and Foreign State 
Pacers instead of in Blue Book form. Between 1839 and 1859
1. Temperley and-Penson. op.cit.. n.xiv. It should be noted . 
that only those "address" papers which were laid in MS and 
subsequently Ordered to be Printed by either House have a 
sessional number. 'Command* papers sometimes have a sessio­
nal number for the same reason. Both types of papers, how­
ever, seem to have been laid in print, from an early period. 
The reason for the distinction is that papers laid in MS 
are printed by the House and numbered'by the Vote Office, 
others by the Stationery Office (May, 14th ed., p.258).
apapers laid in Response to an Address make up about one-fifth 
of the total number of papers on foreign affairs.! Only 
twenty six or about a quarter of the Addresses appear in Han­
sard. This number is further reduced by the fact that two 
papers resulted from the same address in one case;^ and in 
another, although the motion was formally moved in the House, : 
there was no debate.3 This leave twenty four Addresses which 
were debated, ten of them in the Lords, and there is no case 
of a division being taken against the government.
The second period, 1859-1868, is distinguished by the 
sudden increase in the number of papers laid, the high propor­
tion returned to Addresses, and the even higher proportion of 
debated Addresses as compared to the earlier period. 421 pa­
pers were laid, 113, or more than a quarter, in Response to 
Addresses. Eighteen of these came from the Lords, ninety one 
from the Commons, and four from both Houses. Nearly a third 
of these Addresses were debated. This period is also remark­
able for the only case of a governmental defeat on a motion for 
an address for papers which took place in the whole period 
1839-1914.
After 1868 the percentage of papers laid in response‘to
1. 509 laid, 106 R-A.
2. Syria. Part I reslJ. H.C.(1845). LI.545ff.;
Syria. Part II r6621. H.G.(1845),LI.665ff.; 
both returned to an address H.L., 18 July 1845.
3. H.C., 15 Apr.1858, resulting in Correspondence on Constanti- 
nople-Bussorah Telegraph C2377J, H.0.(1857-8), LX.281-8. ~
an address drops sharply. During the first Gladstone admini­
stration thirty nine papers or about one-sixth were laid in 
this way out of a tot#l of 241. Seven addresses were tabled . 
in the Lords, producing eight Blue Books, and six of them were 
debated. There was no debate on the remaining thirty one which 
were returned to Addresses in the Commons. Thereafter an aver^ 
age of only three percent of the total number of papery were re­
turned to addresses. There are no cases of debate in the Com­
mons, and only five in the Lords, at least one of which was on 
a ministerial motion.
A picture of the history of addresses emerges clearly from 
these figures. Before 1359 they played a constant and regular 
part in the procedure of Parliament; between 1859 and 1868 
there are signs of change in the great number of debated ad­
dresses and the occurrence of a government defeat; after 1868 
the debated address loses its place as a regular part of active 
procedure and becomes formal, while the unopposed motion becomes 
very rare. If, in addition, we examine the debates which took 
place in each period, the development becomes even more clearly 
marked. '
The first point which emerges from a study of the debates 
on Addresses in the period 1839-1859 is that motions were for 
the most part 'real* and not 'formal*. That is the motions 
were designed to obtain papers called for, as well as
I, Cf. A f f  tt-tx (ktK eK.^e-Àyii\ B lO t  i t o o U f f  i S i i  —
IS
discussion mf the subject. Sir Robert Peel had stated in 
1828 that "the usage of that House (the Commons) forbade dis­
cussion on moving for papers which a Minister had officially 
announced beforehand would be unresistinglyigranted",! but this 
principle was by no means always adhered to. It may be sur­
mised that the Government insisted on it only when debate was 
inconvenient to itself. In 1843, for instance, the Lords 
seemed to suspect that this was Aberdeen's motive for agreeing 
to the production of papers concerning the Treaty of Washington 
of August 9, 1842, but he disclaimed any such intention.^ if 
Peel's principle had been strictly observed, it would mean that 
the Government had refused papers in every case where debate 
actually took place on a motion for an address.
This was not so, and here we have the second distinguishing 
characteristic of the first period. ■ Government spokesmen fre­
quently avowed in debate that they had no ob&ection to the pro- 
duction of the papers called for.^ Governments were quite as 
willing to lay papers in Response to Address as by Command.
Even when the Government found it difficult to prepare a Blue 
Book on the Sicilian question in 1849, Lansdowne nonetheless
expressed their willingness to receive a motion for further
4. - - ' ■ ■ - - ■ ‘ '
papers. Even more striking is the case of Hume's motion for
1. Hans. (New Series), XXY.186,
2. Hans.,LXVIII.312-7.
3. Ibid.. LI7.685; XCIV.606.
4. Ibid., GIV.S22.
papers concerning the Ionian Islands in 1852. He made a 
short speech, violently attacking the administration, yet Sir 
John Pawkington replied that "He was perfectly ready and willing 
to produce the papers moved for, and had the hon. Gentleman 
asked him for them privately he should have been just as ready
as
and^willing to'have placed them at his disposal* The hon. 
Gentleman, however, could not forego the opportunity which the 
motion gave him of repeating those attacks on Sir Henry Ward" 
and the administration of the Islands. It is clear that at 
this time the address procedure did not represent real pressure 
placed upon the Government by Parliament. It did represent 
Parliamentary initiative, which the governments of the day did 
not discourage.2
Before going on to consider the second period it will be 
convenient to note here that although motions were for the 
most part 'real*, and used by members as a convenient means of 
obtaining both information and discussion,, there were one or 
two cases which resembled the later 'formal' practice. Two 
such cases occurred in Palmerston's first administration^ and 
one in the period 1839-1859. This was in 1842 when Mr. Gaily
1. Hans.. CXXIII.827. I
2. There were even cases of Ministerial motions for papers (cf. 
Temperley and Penson, on.cit., n.299 note); Hans. (New 
Series), XXV.184-90: Hans., VI.877-80; CXXXIV.640-71.
3. (a) Ibid. f IX.7 8 9 - 8 0 8 % ^  Jan. 1832); —
(l)) Ibid.. XIII.1115-52 (28 June 1832).
Knight moved for copies of Russian Ukases concerning Poland.
Since he quoted these papers in his speech his sole object 
seems to have been to draw attention to the miseries of Poland.^ 
In the period 1859-1868, as we have seen, there was an 
exceptionally large number.of 'Address* papers and there were 
thirty four debates. Some of these debates show a practice 
similar to that of the early period. It is clear from the 
debate on Kinglake's motion that the Government did not at 
first object to Addresses being moved.% Nor did they always 
object to debate, several cases occurring of a motion being 
debated and agreed when the Government had no objection to the
■ «Ï
production Of papers.^
The distinction between the opposed and unopposed motion 
remained the same also, and at least four papers were produced 
as unopposed returns after a question in either House.^
1. Hans., LXIV.800-29. 2. Sunra. p.ll.
3. E.g., (^) Hans.. CKXX.273-301;
(b) ibid.. CLXXIII.618-35. This address was in three 
parts, but only one of the papers was nominally returned to 
it, the other two being laid by command (v. 96 L.J.. pp.701-2; 
North America Nos. 2. 6. and 11 (1864)-:
Tel Hans.. CLV.31.
4. (a) Ibid.. CLVII.751-61, resulting in Papers relating to 
Savoy C26509 and. [2650-13, H.C.(l860), LXVII.7-32,33-8.
Cbj Hans., CLIX.2229-30, resulting in Despatches relating to 
Disturbances in Syria [2734], H.C.(i860), LXIX.447-552. These 
papers are listed as No.581 in A Century of Diplomatic Blue 
Books with a footnote to the effect that an Address for them ; 
was defeated in the'Lords after a similar motion had been 
agreed in the Commons (Temperley and Penson, op.cit.. p.172 
note). It is clear from the debate, however, that the papers 
moved for in the Lords on 3 Aug. ' wefe not the same as those 
requested by the Commons. Wodehouse, in resisting Lord
There were, however, innovations. Between 1859 and 18G8 
there is evidence of very real pressure upon the government to 
produce papers. Indeed, the Government was once defeated, and 
this is the only case of an Address being carried against the 
wishes of the Government which took place in the whole period 
1839 to 1914. The first of these instances of pressure, in 
point of time, took place in 1880 on the question of Savoy and 
Nice. Granville, pleading that the motion should not be made, 
claimed that "it was almost without precedent, if not irregular, 
to call for the production of Correspondence which the Govern­
ment had stated it would not be for the public service at pre­
sent to produce".! Malmesbury challenged this extraordinary 
statement, and insisted on Normanby's right to move for papers 
because the Government "has imparted to us no information, at
least only by bits and scraps;  — and out of this confused
mass we have to try to extract something like the truth",&
No division took place, but the Government were compelled to 
accept Normanby's motion. Again in 1864 a motion for papers
concerning Poland was refused outright by Russell, who finally
had to give way before the insistence of the House.%
Stratford de Redliffe's motion, clearly distinguished between 
: the two sets, and after debate the motion was withdrawn in the
usual manner (Hans., CLX.615-27).
(c) Ibid., CLXXI.1226-8, resulting in Correspondence_respec- 
tinc Brazilian Slave Trade [3189], H .C.(1863;, LXXIII.365-74. 
1. Hans., CLVI.loil.■ 2. Ibid.. CLVI.1017.
3. Ibid.. CLXXV.1230, resulting in Papers relating to the arrest
of Rev. P.Anderson [3361]. H.C.(1864).^LXVI.595-606.
nIn 1865 Russell refused papers relating to the imprisonment 
of British subjects in Abyssinia, on the ground that the dis­
closures would result in the prisoners being treated with greater
4 ' - ' -
severity. Lord Chelmsford held that Russell "was not justified 
in his refusal", and the Mouse supported him on a division being 
taken, by a majority of one. Thereupon the Government ques­
tioned the validity of the vote of a peer who had entered the 
House after the question had been put, but they were unable to 
obtain a reversal of the result.^ -
These are undoubtedly cases w^ere the motion for an address 
for papers was given its full scope as a Parliamentary weapon 
to obtain information which the House desired and the Ministry 
wished to withhold, but the period 1859-1868 saw also a great 
increase in the use of the formal motion, which was very occa­
sionally used in the earlier period* In 1860 the Marquess of 
Ulanricarde moved for a despatch to the Duke of Wellington in 
1815, as a vehicle for declaring his present opposition to a 
conference on the question of Savoy and Nice.*^ in l86l Earl 
Grey explained in moving for papers relating to China that if 
"there should be the slightest objection, on the part of Her 
Majesty's Government to produce any despatches they might have 
received, I shall not press my motion; indeed my principal
1* Hans., GLXXIX.738.
2, PbM., cols.739-40, resulting in Papers relating to Abyssinia 
[3536] and [35751, H.C.{1865), LYV.959,974,975ff. '
3. Hans., CLIX.1925-44. ;
object in making it is that it will give an opportunity of 
calling your attention to the general subject of our relations 
with China".1 -
A third instance shows the estimate of the value of an 
address made by one member of the Lower House. , John Pope 
Hennessy, moving for papers on Poland in 1861, concluded a long 
speech by saying; "Probably on another occasion, some Member 
of greater influence and position then.I have the honour to 
hold, will.make a more important Motion on this subject,.. At 
present, with the double object of endeavouring to obtain infor­
mation and of calling attention to a subject so disgraceful to 
British diplomacy in the past, ...I content myself with moving"
p
an address. _ The papers for which he asked were then thirty 
years old and it may be assumed that discussion, rather than 
information, was his aim.
After 1868 the address procedure had become formalised. 
Papers were still laid in 'Response to an Address* but there is 
no,case of a debate in the Commons resulting in the carrying 
of a motion for an address. In the Lords the procedure re­
tained some reality for a little longer but even there, there 
was no successful motion after 1892. The procedure for unoppo­
sed motions also dropped out of use and it became usual for a 
private member who desired papers to ask a question to which 
the reply, when there was no objection, was no longer "you may
1. Hans., CLXI.545. 2. Ibid.. CLXIV.222-3.
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move for them" but "we will lay them by Command", The Address 
had become an ordinary motion, an opening for debate, and an 
inconvenient one at that, since it was impossible by this method 
to obtain a straight vote on the issue involved. In 1877 Mr. 
G-athorne Hardy complained of the conduct of the Marquess of 
Hartington because "instead of asking Parliament to censure by 
vote the Government which has been guilty of such conduct" he 
had "concluded by moving for certain papers".^
Thus it appears that the first Gladstone administration 
falls at the beginning of the formal period in the history of 
the Address for Papers. - Thirty^-one papers were moved for by 
the Commons'but none of these motions were debated. The Lords 
still clung to the old procedure and all but one of the four 
motions were debated. In the case of papers returned to.both 
Houses, three of the four motions were debated by the Upper 
House.; The evidence for the use still made in practice of 
the address procedure, therefore, must come from unsuccessful 
motions in the Lower House, and from both types in the Lords. 
There were five motions debated and agreed in the Lords, since 
in one case two papers were returned to the same Address.^ ■
Such was the conservatism of their Lordships' House that four 
of these five debates can be seen to be firmly rooted in the
1. Hans., GGSIXIH.1079-1178. ;
2. Treaties of Guarantee [275] and [275-1], H.0.(1871), LXXII.
. 443,555. . ■ - . -  ^ ^
vu
early practice. Two of them took place on genuine motions for 
papers, debated without government opposition, as had been the 
case in the period before 1859.1 The third was also agreed 
without difficulty but Granville objected to the motion, because 
of the other questions annexed to it, and because, since there 
was no opposition to the production of papers, debate would 
have been more convenient after they had been,laid.2 The 
principle laid down by Peel was still here acknowledged.
Nor did the Ministry always objecg to papers being laid 
in Response to an Address rather than by Command. On 22 Febr­
uary, 1872, Stanhope asked if there would be any objection to 
the production of the American case which was to be submitted 
to the Geneva tribunal, concluding; "If there be not, I would 
move for it as an unopposed return." Granville agreed that it 
would be : produced and said; "It will be laid on the Table if ray 
noble friend moves for it."^ There remains the important de­
bate on Salisbury's motion for a return of Treaties of Guarantee 
which took place on 6 March, 1871.^ This Blue Book was cer­
tainly of some political value to those groups which held the 
'doctrine of non-intervention' but it contained nothing new. . 
Granville defended himpelf against the attack made by Salisbury 
but made no objection to the motion.5 Consequently the fact
1. (a) Hans.. CC7III.10-11; (b) ibid.: CCZVII.290-301.
2. Ibid.. CCIV.562-72. 3. Ibid.. CCIX,681-2.
4. Ibid.. CCiy. 1360-80. 5. Ibid.. c<a. 1375.
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that the motion was carried scarcely justifies its being re­
garded as an instance of Parliamentary pressure. Rather is 
it similar to that motion of which Peel spoke in 1832, saying 
"he could not help expressing his satisfaction that the Motion 
shortly to be put from the chair was of a character so different 
from the tone of the debate", and that "it pledged the House to 
no particular line of conduct". In this respect the debate 
on Guarantees was unlike : one on the same subj ect which occurred 
in 1872 and which will be discussed in its proper place.^
Such were the papers moved for in the traditional manner 
in the House of Lords. .The remaining motions reveal some 
peculiarities but there is^case of a 'formal* motion; that is 
a motion whose "withdrawal at the end of the debate was foreseen
from the beginning".^ There were four motions in allé One
of them was debated and carried in due form, but the papers 
were laid by Command.^ This may have been an oversight, since 
there is evidence in a correspondence which took place be&ween 
R.E. Welby of the Treasury and Hertslet, Librarian of the Foreign 
Office, in 1871,^ that departments were not always certain what 
the correct procedure was, and had become lax about distingui­
shing between papers laid by Command and those returned to Act
1. Hans.. XIII.1148. 2. Infra, p. Iio.
3. Temperley and-Penson, on.cit.. p.xii*
4. Hans.. GOV.545-64, resulting in China Ho.5 (1871) [0.389],
H.C.(1871), LXX.125-612.
5. Welby to Hertslet, 27 July 1871; Hertslet to Welby, same date;
\ Welby to Hertslet, 5 Aug.1871; (P.O.83/329).
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or Address. Another motion which was carried in the Lords 
seems never to have been complied with at all, perhaps because 
it came <bn very late in the session.^ There were two opposed 
motions, one of which was withdrawn when Granville promised 
that the papers should be laid as soon as it was possible to 
make them public.^ On the other occasion, however, Lord 
Campbell moved for "any consular reports of the steps which 
the Russian Government are taking to form the maritime and mi­
litary Arsenals which Clause XIII of the Treaty [of Paris, 1856] 
had prohibited"^ in a long speech attacking British policy in 
relation to the Gortchakov circular. When Granville replied 
that no such papers existed, Campbell pressed his motion to a
A
division, when it was defeated.  ^ It may also be noted that on 
one occasion, when papers on the Alabama claims were laid, an­
ticipating a notice which had.been given to move for them. Lord 
Stratford de Redcliffe still spoke to his motion when the ap­
pointed day arrived,but only in the form of brief 'observa-
5 -
tions*.  ^ '
In the House of Commons, during the first Gladstone Ministry, 
some trace still existed of the old procedure. There was a 
case of question leading to a motion for an unopposed return.^ 
There were two cases of a straight motion for papers being
1. Hans., CCXITI. 1245-7, 23 June 1873, concerning the ship 
"Murillo".
2. Ibid.. CCV.1778. 3. Ibid.. CCVI.788.
4. Ibid.. col.802. 5. Ibid.. CXCVI.1227-35.
6. Ibid.. CCIX.869-r70.
defeated,^ and two more being withdrawn when the Government 
refused to produce the information.% On the other hand, there 
were five formal motions. These related to subjects so divers.^ 
as the Treaty of Washington,^ the Chinese slave trade,^ the po­
sition of Jews in Roumania,5 and the boundaries of Afghanistan.^ 
In each of these cases, the motion was for papers which might 
well have been genuinely desired by the House, but debate took 
place on the subject itself and sometimes the papers were not 
even mentioned. The motions were withdrawn as a matter of 
course, without apy governmental request in the House. Indôed 
in one case the papers were laid by Command ten days after a 
motion for them had been debated and withdrawn,' and here we 
can see the changed attitude of the Government to debated 
addresses. In a case like this, eatlier governments would 
have had no hesitation in accepting the motion and returning 
the papers to the address.
Since the address procedure had thus become formal in the « 
House of Commons, members began to find ingenious ways of using 
it to serve their own personal or political ends. There was 
a motion concerning the property of British subjects lost 
during the Napoleonic war, for which they had not been com-
1. ta)-Hans.. C CIV. 646-58; tb) ibid.. CCHV.440-8.
2. (a) Ibid.. CSCVII.1779-1801; (b) lbia..CCXIV.771-2.
3. Ibid.. CCVIII.861-925. 4. Ibid.. CCIX.529-48.
5. Ibid. . OCX.1585-1604. 6. Ibid.. COXY.818-77.
7. Ibid.. CXC7II.1779-1801. The papers concerned were China 
Ho.12 (1869) [4097-Xl] , H.C.(1868-9), LXIV.285-96.
&1,
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pensated. The Government spokesman maintained that it T/as 
not really an address for papers at all. On another occasion 
there was a motion for a reprint of the Treaties excluding the 
Bonaparte family from the throne of France which Tiras refused 
hecap.se it "might he open to misconstruction".2
The history of the use of the address procedure between 
1839 and 1914 is now clear. From 1839 to 1859 it was con­
stantly used to obtain papers and discussion, without any Mi­
nisterial jealousy of this instance of initiative on the part 
of private members. The second period was transitional.
Only then was the address given its fu±l weight as a Parliamen­
tary weapon to be used against the Government, which naturally 
brought a reaction and caused later governments to discounte­
nance the procedure and look upon the carrying of addresses as 
defeats.
It may be tentatively suggested that the constitutional 
background to these changes is as follows: In the first period,
the connection of the address procedure with the royal prero­
gative, deterred governments from interfering with the right of 
members to approach the Crown in this manner. A writer in 
1853 declared that the Foreign Office had "to a certain extent, 
escaped the constitutionalising process" which had affected all 
the other departments of government except the armed services.^
1. Hans.. CXCYI.1445-8. 2. Ibid.. CCIII.1668-9.
3. Saturday Review. 1859. VIII.62/2. ' '
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If this was so, it seems likely that the Foreign Office felt 
the traditional procedure by address to be more correct than 
governmental initiative in the matter of papers.
In the second period governments were becoming more in­
dependent. The Palmerston Government had to face severe 
criticism of their foreign policy in both Houses, and conse­
quently the carrying of an address for papers which they did 
not wish to give was as much a defeat as a vote of censure.
After the Reform Act of 1867 there, was a strong government 
majority and very little chance of an opposed address being 
carried, so the procedure in its real form fell out of use and 
the address became simply an opening for debate. Successive- 
governments, based on a democratic franchise, took upon them­
selves the task of issuing by Command such papers as they con­
sidered necessary for the enlightenment of the public.
(c) Amendments to Sunnlv and Substantive Motions.
Information having been obtained from questions. Blue 
Books, or other sources, various methods were open to members 
to obtain discussion of questions of foreign policy. The 
method most frequently used in the period 1868-1874 was that 
of amendment to the motion for going into Committee of Supply. 
In Ï868 the rule of the House was that "the Committee of Supply 
and Ways and Means...may be appointed fir any day on which the
4
House shall meet for the despatch of Bublic Business". When­
ever these Committees were to take place, members were free to 
move any amendment to the question that "the Speaker do leave 
the Chair" and the normal rules of the Commons as to relevancy 
were completely disregarded on these occasions. This practice 
was sanctioned by the Committee on Procedure of 1861.^ The 
third recommendation of this Committee was that the discussion 
on the motion for the weekend adjournment should be prohibited, 
but as compensation to the private member entered a proviso 
'that while the Committee of Supply and of Ways and Means are 
open, the first Order of the Day on Friday shall be either 
Supply or Ways and Means and that on that Order being read the 
motion shall be made "that the Speaker do leave the Chair"
The views of the Committee were accepted by the House and em­
bodied in the Standing Orders' of 3 May, 1861.
Erskine May considered the practice of amendment to the 
motion for Supply "most inconvenient",^ because it detracted 
from that certainty in the arrangement of business which was 
so desirable if the government was to administer efficiently. 
Days might pass in which the House would consider the,motions 
of private members, and the government would have made no 
progress towards obtaining their supply. This defect was
1..S.0., 3 May, 1861. 116. C.J.. p.185.
2. A. and P. (1861). XI.431.
3. Ibid.. p.442.
4. May (8th ed.), p.613.
remedied to some extent in 1872 on the recommendation of the 
Committee of Procedure of 1871,^ The Committee suggested 
that except on Thursdays and Fridays the Speaker should leave 
the Chair, when the Order for the Committee had been read,
p
without putting the question. The Standing Order embodying 
this principle also restricted amendments on going into Com­
mittee of Supply on Mondays to matters which were relevant to 
the class of Estimates about to be considered, and further 
restricted these amendments to the first day on which it was 
proposed to go into Committee on each class of Estimates.^
It may be noted that even these changes did not meet  ^
Erskine May's wishes. He said, when giving evidence before 
the 1878 ^Committee on Procedure:^ »»I think that opportunities 
for discussion on going into Committee of Supply have become 
a great evil and an evil which requires to be corrected and 
corrected vigorously, in some form or. o t h e r . H e  went on to 
suggest that Friday should be a notice day° - maintaining that 
discussion "could be more effectively carried on, on Notices 
of Motions than on amendments on going into Committee of Supply 
because members are often shut out from bringing on their 
amendments on going into Committee of Supply in consequence of
1. A. and P. (l87l). IX.1. 2. Ibid.. p.3.
3. 127 C.J.. p.66. This order was agreed only after a long de­
bate and in face of considerable opposition in the House 
(Hans., CCIX.1058-99).
4. A. and P. (1878). XVIII.Iff.
5. Ibid., ip.26, qu.7. 6. Ibid.. p.27, qu.l7.
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the rule that if the first is negatived all the others are 
merely reduced to observations, not amendments".^ This was 
indeed: the case, but the use of this procedure had advantages 
also, because since the House was sometimes enabled to discuss 
different topics without being tied to a formal motion, they 
obtained on these occasions a freedom of discussion usually to 
be found only in the House of Lords.
The increasing volume of business dealt with by the House 
of Commons led in a quarter of a century to changes more far- 
reaching than any Erskine May could have proposed or foreseen. 
These are fully set out in the new edition of Parliamentary 
Practice^ - we need refer to them only briefly. The House 
found it impossible to deal in detail with the strictly finan­
cial aspects of the Estimates, and under the Standing Orders
of 1902 the Government permitted opposition criticism in the
Committee itself on the days allotted to supply, having ensured 
that the supply would be passed in good time by a system of 
closures. This full discussion in the Committee caused amend­
ments to the motion that the Speaker leave the Chair to be re­
duced to negligible proportions.
In the period 1868-1874, the amendment on going into Com­
mittee of Supply was freely used by private members on both
1. A. and P. (1878). XVIII.24. qu.lS.
2. May (14th ed.), pp.287-8,690-1.-
3. 157 C.J.. DP.629-35.
sides of the House to discuss questions of foreign policy.
Apart from the motions for papers moved in this way they were
-tke
eight in number and included 'full-dress* debates on\««r atti-
1 '
tude to the Franco-Prussian war, and on international law, in
connection with the 'Three Buies' of the Treaty of Washington*^
fj £r*t;sk
Particular questions, such as slavery in C u b a , p o l i c y  in 
West Africa,^ as well as very general questions such as the 
policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other states^ and 
the submission of treaties to Parliament before ratification^ 
were all fully discussed at different times on going into 
Committee of-Supply. It was indeed a very convenient method 
of raising debate, which was freely open to the private member.
There were four other methods of challenging the Govern­
ment open to the private member, but one of them, the motion 
of the holiday adjournment, was not used for the discussion df 
foreign policy in this period. The other type of adjournment 
motion, however, which later became an 'urgency' motion, was 
once used to bring in a discussion of the Belgian neutrality 
question.*^ The Queen's Speech contained references to foreign 
policy at the beginning of every session except that of 1870 
but whether or not the speech actually referred to such 
questions, members were at liberty to discuss them during the
1. Haim, r CCIV.387-455. 2. I M d . ,  CCXIV. 1963-2055.
3. Ebid., CCX.1550—73. 4. Ibid., CCVI.1806— 23 (counted out)
5. Ib.id., CCX. 1151-83. 6. Ibid.. CCXIV.448-90.
7. Ibid.. CCIII.1738-45. ~
debate on the Address. Finally, any private member could * 
give notice of a motion on the day allotted to such business 
(in this period Tuesday) and this method was used for foreign 
policy three times in this period.
In addition to these opportunities for initiation of de­
bate by private members the Government could always 'give a 
day* for a vote of censure, and this was the case with Sir 
Charles Dilke's motion on the Black Sea question.^
(d) Foreign Office Vote.
. ,Parliament had opportunities for obtaining information
and discussion but in theory the ultimate means of Parliamen­
tary control over the administration lay in voting the estimates, 
since the Commons had the^right to refuse ompplies for any pur­
pose which’they did not approve.
It has been mentioned in connection with amendments to the 
motion for Committee of Supply^ that a practice later- developed 
of criticising policy rather than the estimates themselves, and 
this practice grew to such an extent that in the l9l4 Committee 
on Public Business, a member complained that the recent d i s - ' 
cussion on the Foreign Office vote was "very likely all [the 
time} we will have this year".^ In the period we have to con­
sider, this practice had not yet begun, although experiments
1. Hans., CCIX.319-29; GCXIV.1309-19; CCXVII.52-90.
2. Ibid>, CCV.894— 976. 3. Supra, p.SO- _
4. A._ and P. (1914). VII.693, qu.3005.
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had been tried earlier in connection with other branches of
the Civil Service Estimates which pointed the way to the later
development. The first of these took place on 11 June, 1857;
when the Secretary to the Treasury, James Wilson, gave notice
that he intended to make a general statement in moving the
first vote of the Civil Service Estimates. This was already
the established practice with regard to the Army and Navy
Estimates, but the propriety of introducing it for the Civil
1
Service Estimates was questioned by several members. • The
next evening when Wilson made his statement he met severe .
2
criticism of the course he had pursued. The difficulty 
arose because with the permission of the House hei,made a general 
statement referring to several votes, but when other members 
rose to speak they were precluded by the rules of the House 
from referring in detail to votes which were not yet before 
the Committee. The debate became desultory and as a member 
said, the House was "proceeding in a very unsatisfactory man-
Æ
ner". This experiment was not repeated in 1877 when a similar 
statement was made on the Civil Service Estimates, not in Com­
mittee but on the motion that "the Speaker do leave the Chair".^ 
This innovation passed without comment, but three months later 
when it Tiras proposed to make.a similar statement on the education
1. Hans.. CXLV.1568-8.
3. May (8th ed.), p.627.
5. Ibid.. CCXXXIII.651.
2. Ibid.. cols.1689-1727.
4. Hans.. CXLV.1724.
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votes, the Government was compelled, by protests from the House, 
to postpone it until the House was in Committee.1 When this
was done there was, in fact, neither debate nor opposition to 
2the vote; it therefore appears that the protests were directed 
against Government appropriation of the motion for the Speaker 
to leave the Chair when' several private members wished to move 
amendments. None of these experiments were really successful, 
because they took place under the ordinary procedure, which was 
not well adapted to general discussions of policy. It was not 
until the procedure was altered in 1302 that general discussion 
became possible.
During Gladstone's first administration, therefore. Par­
liament confined itself to criticising the details of the 
estimates. The salaries of the Queen's Messengers was a sub­
ject frequently discussed;^ so, also, was Secret Service 
money.^ It is notable that the independent Liberal member 
Peter Hylands was the prime mover in all the attempts at economy 
which took place during.this Parliament,.the rest of the House 
evincing little interest. In 1873 indeed, the Foreign Office 
Estimates were passed without any amendment or debate.^ ,
1. Hans., CCXXXV.1047-53. ^
2. Ibid.r cols.1079-84.
3. Ibid.. CXC7II.1677 (1863); CCII.334-7 (lS70); CGYI.1385-9 
11871).
4. I M d . ,  CCX.841-8 (iB72); CGXI.1543 (1872).
5. Ibid.. CCXV.1008.
 ^ . Conclusion.
It is, of course, unwise to take too technical & view of 
Parliamentary procedure. Although it is to seme extent true 
that procedure governs the amount of influence which Parlia­
ment could exert, it is also partly true that procedural 
changes merely mirror constitutional development. Procedure 
is, after all, only a means to an end, an instrument of which 
Parliament haê complete control and which may he altered at 
will by a simple resolution. A  strong government may. take 
-any step it pleases to minimise or even abolish Parliamentary 
influence.-  ^ .
Yet it is possible to describe Parliamentary procedure 
at any given time and to assess its usefulness for influencing 
the executive. ? The procedure for the time being inevitably 
affects to some extent the character of the debates, and limits 
Parliament's power of discussing a subject. In addition, even 
those forms of procedure which appear to be the most technical, 
and the most divorced from practical politics, often retain 
some element of reality. In the period under discussion this 
can be seen particularly in the Address for Papers and even 
more in the Foreign Office Vote. The constitutional impli­
cations of this financial procedure seem quite inapplicable 
to modern constitutional development - Parliament can turn out 
a government, but is not likely to starve it out - and yet the
principle viras appealed to on occasion. In the course of dis­
cussion of the Geneva arbitration, an appeal was made to the 
House to refuse to vote money to pay any award made against 
Britain, and again in a debate on our treaty obligations, the 
principle was reaffirmed that Parliament held the purse strings, 
and could prevent the country going to war in fulfilment of 
such an obligation.
Because of these factors the technical details of proce­
dure are of real importance to an assessment of Parliamentary ■ 
influence and it is clear that, theoretically, procedure was 
adequate to enable Parliament to influence the executive.
The use made of these opportunities in a House dominated by a 
strong party majority remains to be considered. This state 
of affairs was something of a new development in 1868, and was 
ultimately to result in changes &n procedure, and it is in this 
sense that procedure provides a reflection, if belated, of 
constitutional history.
Chapter II.
THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO PARLIAMENT.
When the Gladstone Government took office, full and effi­
cient newspaper reporting had become an established feature of 
English life. Several papers had g r o w n u p  since the 'fifties 
as rivals to the Times. and the development of reporting by 
the telegraphic agencies, particularly Reuter's, enabled the 
public and Parliament to receive information on foreign affairs 
in advance of official pronouncements.^
During the negotiations with the United States, particu­
larly on the question of the indirect claims, documents pub­
lished in the American press and transmitted by telegraph to 
the British press, reached Parliament long before the British 
Government was ready to give information.% The Franco-Prussian 
war was 'covered* far more efficiently than any previous con­
flict. Not only in the military, but also in the diplomatic 
aspects of this question. Parliament received the news first 
from the papers, in many cases.3 Particularly remarkable as 
an example of previous newspaper information is the communica­
tion of the Benedetti Treaty to the Times by the(Russian 
Minister in London.4 -
1. History of 1È* The Times, ii. chs.4,13,14.
2. Infra, pp. 6 1 , 3 .  Infra. - pÿ.
4. History of The Times, ii.424-8.
Notwithstanding these facte, Parliament would not be con­
tent with information from the press. Members were jealous 
of earlier information being given to, or obtained by, the 
newspapers, and insisted on having official information as a 
basis for their debates. Two examples will serve to illustrate 
this attitude. On June 4, 1869, Hord Stratford de Redcliffe 
spoke to his Motion for Papers on the negotiations with the 
United States, explaining that he had "had no desire to provoke 
a premature or inconvenient discussion...but only to obtain in­
formation which the Press already had".^ Again, on July 25, 
1870, Disraeli complained of the delay in the presentation of 
the promised papers on the Franco-Pruesian war, saying, "It 
seems to me somewhat absurd that the peace of Europe should be 
broken on a scale so vast...and that Parliament should really 
have no conception of the causes of such an event".% In fact, 
members had reasonably full and detailed information from the 
press, but there had been no Blue Book.
The Parliament of 1868-74, then, considered it had a right 
to official information, and although the Address procedure had 
become inoperative by this time as a practical means of exer­
cising pressure, yet pressure from members in the course of 
debate was so strong that, had the government wished to ref$se
1. Hans., CXCVI.1227, The papers for which notice of the motion 
had been given had already been produced by Oommand on 31 May, 
as North America No.1(1869).
2. Hans.. CCIII.881-2.
all information, it could not long have survived. The general 
principles of the Blue Book policy of the Gladstone Government 
will he considered later;^ for the moment it may simply he 
stated that Blue Books were forthcoming on each of the major 
questions of policy, as the list of papers given in A Century 
of Diplomatic Blue Books shows.2
The practice of the Foreign Office when compiling a Blue 
Book, however, provided a subtler method of concealing infor­
mation, since it allowed the frequent publication of extracts 
from documents without any indication of what kind of material 
was omitted. The usual form of a motion for papers was for 
"Copies or Extracts" from a correspondence. On one occasion 
Gladstone refused to accept a motion which was not so worded.3 
In addition to this use of the extract form, private letters, 
not being official documents, were never published.
To establish whether Parliament had adequate and accurate 
information on which to base its judgement, it is therefore 
necessary to compare the Foreign Office Blue Books with the 
documents from which they were compiled, and also to study the 
private correspondence conducted by the Foreign Secretary.
For the purpose of estimating the amount of information which 
was omitted from Blue Books in this period, four major diplomatic
1. Infra, pp.
2. Temperley and Penson, on.cit., pp.222-50.
3. Hans.. CCIV.649-50; cf. Temperley and Penson, on.cit.. p.217.
questions which also received considerable Parliamentary atten­
tion have been studied.
These were the negotiations with America, including the 
Treaty of Washington and the Geneva Arbitration; the Franco- 
Prussian war and the diplomatic issues involved in it, inclu­
ding the question of Belgian neutrality; the Black Sea question, 
arising from the Gortchakov circular; and the Central Asian 
question. In addition, some reference will be made t@ the 
'Tornado* case. This was not an issue of any very great im­
portance, and indeed was almost concluded when the Gladstone 
Government took office, for which reason it falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. It is valuable, however, as an illus­
tration of almost every aspect of Blue Book policy, and will 
therefore be incidentally mentioned. Some general principles 
upon which omissions from Blue Books.were made may be deduced 
from a comparison of these topics.
In the first place it should be noted that telegrams were 
never published in the form in which they were received. Pre­
sumably this was done to safeguard the cypher, for if the cy­
phered version had been intercepted, publication in the original 
form would immediately provide the key to it. Occasionally a 
summary or paraphrase of a telegram appeared in a Blue Book, 
but more usually only the despatch recording it was published. 
Since there was often no indication that the information had
been previously received by telegrpph, this eften had the effect
of making it appear that the Foreign Office received a given
piece of information much later than was actually the case; but
it seems unlikely that anyone was misled by this practice.
'
- Apart from this there were several other groups of.what 
may be described as 'routine*remissions. For instance, reports 
of debates in foreign assemblies and cuttings.from foreign news- 
papers, regularly sent home by ambassadors, were never pub­
lished except when, as during the Franco-Prussian war, the press 
was used by both belligerents for governmental announcements af­
fecting European diplomacy.2
Another type of omission was information obtained by pri­
vate enquiry or volunteered by private individuals. Of this
X r
|he Tornado case is a good example. . Many individuals connec­
ted with the firms involved sent what information they had con­
cerning the antecedents of the ship and her crew to the Foreign
Office, whose attitude was affected thereby to a considerable
extent, but very little of this information was published.^
1. E.g., Buchanan to Clarendon, No.60, 24 Feb.1869 (F.D.65/870);
Buchanan to Clarendon, No.66, 2 Mar.1869 (F.O. 65/870); 
Thornton to Clarendon, No.88, 28 Feb.1870 (F.8.5/1331); 
Thornton to Clarendon, No.143, 19 Apr.l869(F.0.5/1329).
2. Franco-Prussian War No.l (1870). LXX.26, No#6 incl.
ibid. p.19, No.29 incl.
; ibid; p.38, No.62 incl.
Franco-Prussian War No.3 (1870), LXX.2, No.3 incl.
ibid. p.32, No.32 incl.
ibid. : p.33, No.33 incl.
3. E.g., Garrett to Stanley, 12 May 1867 (F.O. 72/1295);
Also regularly omitted were actual private letters which 
passed-between ambassadors and members of the Foreign Office, 
but of course only a few of these appear in the official re­
cords. When the information they contained was to be made 
public, the letters were usually altered and made official.^
It was a recognised principle that Parliament had no 
right to call for the production of the opinions of the Law 
Officers of the Grown on any subject.& Inter-departmental 
correspondence was also frequently omitted although it was of 
considerable importance in the "Tornado* case, and also in the 
Central Asian question.^ ■
The last group of routine omissions included any part of 
a despatch which could be considered in any way derogatory to 
a nation or an individual. For;instance. Consul Dunlop thought
Playne to F.O,, 1 Mar.1867 (F.O. 72/1293);
: Anon, to F.O., 9 May 1867 (F.O. 72/1296):
Holmes to F.O., 5 Mar.1869 (F.O. 72/1298),
It is scarcely possible to describe as a group the omission 
of many more letters of good advice from individuals. These 
were received in connection with every question of foreign 
policy and described by Tenterden as "fools* rubbish". Ten- 
terden memo., 17 Feb.1872 (F.O.5/1394).
1. Hammond to Thornton, 16 Jan.1869 (F.O. 5/1329).
2. But ministers were permitted to cite them in debate if nece­
ssary (May, 14th ed.(1946), pp.434-5). The only reference 
given by May for the origin of this principle is to a state­
ment made by Palmerston on 17 Feb. 1865. The reason he gave 
was that "The Law Officers would be more cautious in expres­
sing an opinion if they knew that it was to be laid before 
Parliament and the public" (Hans., CLXXVII.354).
3 . -E.g., I.0. to F.O., 6 July 1869 (F.O.65/870);
B. of T. to F.O., 7 May 1867 (F.O.72/1296):
AdmY. to F.O., 10 Sept.1866 (F.O.72/1289).
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taie Cadiz police "an ill-conditioned set of ruffians";^ the 
Spanish officials on the spot "jealous and touchy";^ and that 
the Spanish Government "may not know much about the laws of 
Spain, and still less about International Law".3 Sir Edward 
Thornton was of opinion that "General Schenck certainly did 
not understand the nature" of Mr. Fish's objections to a Bri­
tish proposal,^ and on another occasion that "Mr. Fish has made 
the most of, and even distorted what I said to him".^ A Rus­
sian statesman described the Khan of Bokhara as "little better 
than a savage", but thought Shere Ali "a more civilised ruler".& 
This group naturally includes the omission of Bismarck's refer­
ence to the French as "a band of robbers" in t h e ‘famous Loftus 
aespatoh of 13 July 1870.? -
The omission of these classes of information was for the 
most part not of any very great importance. Press and Parlia­
mentary reports from foreign countries were in any case avai­
lable to the public through the newspapers. Members of either 
House of Parliament probably had their own views on the charac­
ters of diplomatic personalities, or the best epithets to
1. Dunlop to Crampton, No.8, 13 Feb.1867, in Crampton to Stanley, 
: No.49, 15 Feb.1867 (F.O.72/1292).
2. Dunlop to Stanley, No.8, 20 Jan.1867 (F.O.72/1291).
3. Dunlop to Crampton, No.29, 31 Dec.1866, in Dunlop to Stanley, 
No.65, same date (F.O.72/1291).
4. Thornton to Grabville, No.296, Confidential, 13 May 1872 
(F.O.5/1399).
5. Thornton to Granville, No.309, 17 May 1872 (F.O.5/1399).
6. Buchanan to Gl(xrèâaô-«, No.104, Confidential, 2 Mar. 1870 
(F.O.65/872).
ÿ. Loftus to Granville, No.27, Confidential, 13 July 1870 
(F.O.64/688).
describe the policies of foreign nations. Information ob­
tained by the Foreign Office from individuals was only of real 
importance on the 'Tornado* affair, which was a very minor 
matter. The inter-departmental correspondence was the only 
category whose omission was of significance.
Probably this information was withheld because it was ne­
cessary for the Foreign Office to take responsibility in these 
matters even when they had received advice or assistance from 
other departments. The most important instance of the sup­
pression of this type of information, however, was in the case 
ofJthe Oentral Asian question, where the India Office was con­
cerned. Since that Office was notoriously secretive about 
its proceedings, the principle of withholding inter-departmental 
correspondence may not have had a general application. Whether 
or not this was the case, the effect of the omissions in this 
instance was to conceal how much the British Government were 
doing to try to keep things quiet on the frontiers of India, 
and to.prevent trouble with Russia in that area.
It may be assumed that the decision to make these 'routine' 
omissions did not have to be taken at a very high level in the 
Foreign Office hierarchy, but omissions of greater significance 
sometimes occurred. In the first place opinions on, or reports 
of the policies of foreign governments were not generally pub­
lished. For instance. Lord Bloomfield sent home his views
on Count Beuat’a policy since hla appointment as foreign 
minister, suggesting that he had reversed the policy of his 
predecessors and desired "a connection with France in prefer­
ence to any other country".! On 10 July, 1870, Granville 
wrote that he believed "the French Government are determined 
to have an immediate solution of the CHohenzoilernl question.•• 
and it would be useless to attempt to influence them" in the 
direction of waiting for a meeting of the Cortes.% Shortly 
before the despatch of the Gortchakov circular Granville told 
the Turkish ambassador in London that h e % a s  inclined to be­
lieve that the Porte need not now feel any unusual suspicion
of any designs on the part of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg
hostile to the independence or integrity of the Turkish Em­
pire". This statement was omitted from the Blue Book, and as 
it happened Granville was wrong, but as he had ppinted out "it 
was impossible for Her Majesty’s Government to answer forCthe
possible views of any foreign Power",3 This was the reason
for this class of omissions, as was clearly stated by Gladstone 
in the House of Commons on 20 February, 1871. LoAd John Man­
ners asked why the despatches referred to by Sir Andrew Bucha­
nan on page 13 of the Blue Book on the Black Sea question had
not been included in that volume. These referred to Buchanan’s
1. Bloomfield to Granville, Ho.27, Secret and Confidential,
20 July 1870 (F.OW 7/767).
2. Granville to Loftus, Ho.9, 11 July 1870 (F.0.64/681).
3. Granville to Elliot, Ho.207, 6 Oct.1870 (F.0.78/2120).'
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opinion "that a proposal on the part of Hussia for the revision 
of the Treaty (of Paris) would not l>e long delayed". Gladstone 
replied that they were confidential despatches "expressive of 
the surmises and anticipations of Sir Andrew Buchanan, and we 
do not think it would he desirable to produce them".*^ Simi­
larly, it was considered inexpedient to publish despatches 
which referred to the internal difficulties of a foreign go­
vernment, such as one which described the party influences 
which might induce Italy to join France in the war against 
Prussia.^
It sometimes happened that papers were withheld as the 
result of a direct request from a foreign government. This 
was the case with the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington.
In answer to an enquiry, the Commissioners reported to Gran­
ville that "it was determined at the first conference that no 
detailed account of the proceedings of the High Commission 
should be given in the Protocols which must be submitted to the 
Senate of the United States at the close of the negotiations, 
together With any Treaty which may be concluded".^ Opinion in 
the Foreign Office was that there would be "a frightful row" in 
Parliament about the meagreness of these protocols,^ but the
1. Hans.y CCIV.494-5.
2. Paget to Granville, No.52, 1 Aug.1870 (F.0.45/165).
3. Commissioners to Granville, Secret, 4 Mar.1871 (F,0.5/1300).
4. Minute by Hammond on Protocol III enclosed in Commissioners 
to Granville, No.14, 8 Mar.1871 (F.0.5/1300).
4Commissioners maintained their attitude.! Similarly, Prince 
Gortchakov dwelt a great deal on the essentially confidential 
and private nature of the communications that had passed "be­
tween Clarendon and himself on the subject of Central Asia",^ 
with the result that, although ultimately most of the despat­
ches were published, this did not talce place until more than 
three years had passed.^ :
In cases where the government required considerable free­
dom of action, documents were often necessarily omitted. On 
the one hand, in the course of the delicate negotiations which 
preceded any important international transaction, documents 
were dften produced which it was impossible, for reasons of 
policy, to publish. . The negotiations concerning the Black 
Sea question are a good example of this.
Despatches to and from each country connected .with the 
negotiation were omitted from the Blue Books, and in almost 
every case they represented attempts to obtain support in the 
forthcoming conference, or allies should it not be successful. 
In the course of these exchanges an attempt was made to obtain 
the accession of Prussia to the Tripartite Treaty, but was un­
successful and remained secret.4 Similarly the French tried
i* Infra. p.C&
2. Dumbold tfi Clarendon, No.68, Confidential, 2 June 1869 (F.O. 
65/870). : . .
3. Central Asia No.2 (1873), 18.7043, H.C.(1870), LXXV.7l3ff.
4. Branville to Odo Hussell. No.35, Most Confidential, 7 Dec.l870 
(F.O.64/737);
4?
to obtain a close understanding ?«rith England, which fell through 
because England refused to recognise the provisional government.
On the other hand, when a negotiation was in progress, it 
was inevitable that there should be a certain amount of confi­
dential discussion of expedients between diplomatists, often 
of a very vague character. Even when these conversations were 
embodied in a written form, they were not suitable for publi­
cation. There was, for instance, Lord Augustus Loftus’ plan 
of trying to prevent any action being taken by France or Prussia 
in the Hohenzollern affair before the Spanish Cortes met, so 
that it might be possible to arrange for an adverse vote, or 
the submission of a new candidate, in the hope that this would 
remove any pretext for war.^
Omissions of this nature occurred even more frequently in 
the case of the American negotiations. When the difficulty 
over the indirect claims arope. General Cchenck, the American 
Minister to London, frequently discussed the situation with 
Granville in an unofficial manner and without instructions,3
Granville to Elliot, No.277, Confidential, 17 Dec.1870 (F.O. 
78/2120);
Elliot to Granville, No.369, 20 Dec.1870 (F.O.78/2126); 
Granville to Elliot, No.282, 24 Dec.1870 )F.0.78/2120).
1. Lyons to Granville, No.7, Confidential, 3.Jan.1871 (F.O. 
27/1854);
Granville t® Lyons, No.66, 20 Jan.187$ (F.O.27/1850).
2. Granville to Loftus, No.6, 10 July 1870 (F.0.64/681); 
Bloomfield to Granville, No.5, Confidential, 11 July 1870 
(F.O.7/767).
3. Granville to Thornton, No.65, Most Confidential, 16 Feb.1872 
(F.O.5/1394);
Tanterden to Granville, tel.. Private, 15 Apr.1872 (P.O. 
5/1396).
and indeed carried this practice to such lengths th&t Granville 
protested against it.! Thornton, too, had frequent ’confiden­
tial* conversations with Fish, which reached a stage where the 
Foreign Office feared they might become dangerous and Hammond 
wrote to Granville: "I fear that unless you put a peremptory 
stop to Thornton’s discussing expedients with Fish, the latter 
will be encouraged to hope th&t he may still find a way of es­
cape or at all events go on writing the matter out indefinitely 
till the 15 of June" (the date fixed for the presentation of 
counter cases to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva).% The 
American Secretary, however, very much preferred this mode of 
communication and made it very difficult for Thornton to obtain 
information which he could call official, as he explained: "He 
CFishl has always expressed his wish that foreign ministers 
should visit him it the State Department only once a week - on 
Thursday, so that unless I can make a pretext for going there 
on some other day, I have but few opportunities of speaking to 
him at his Office. At his own house and elsewhere, I meet him 
often enough, but on these occasions his remarks must be con­
sidered, according to his theory, as confidential and in no way 
b i n d i n g . clearly, unofficial information could be a handicap
1. Granville to Thornton, No.ISl, Confidential, 7 May 1872 (F.O. 
5/1398).
2. Hammond memo., 27 Apr.1872 (P.O.5/1397).
3. Thornton to Granville, No.232, Confidential, 16 Apr.1872 
(PÏO.5/1397).
to the Foreign Office for information bo obtained could not be 
published and a foreign government which wished to procrasti­
nate could not be pinned down. At other times, of course, it 
could be a very useful weapon.
The desire for greater freedom of action can also be seen 
in the other large group of omissions from Blxee Books which* 
occurred in this administration. The negotiations which led 
to the signing of the Treaty of Washington were opened by a, 
secret mission undertaken by Sir John Hose, a Canadian banker. 
The initial scheme, drawn up by Tenterdeh, exists in the form 
of a confidential print, dated November 21, 1870, and states 
that relations are "unsatisfactory" at a time "when England 
stands on the verge of a Hussian war"; yet "any direct ap­
proach for the purpose of dealing with the Alabama claims... 
is open to the objection th&t it might be looked upon as a 
surrender of the English case and a bid for securing American 
neutrality in the event of a Hussian war".! Another print 
gives Sir John Hose’s comments on this draft and agrees that 
"It is important to prevent another failure in negotiations".^ 
Thus because Britain needed some flexibility in the machinery 
of negotiation, but also because the government feared the 
responsibility of initiation with the prospect of another
1. Tenterden memo., 21 Nov.1870 (F.O.5/1331).
2. Hose memo., 5 Dec.1870 (F.O.5/1331).
Sî
rebuff as had happened In the case of the Clarendon-Johnson 
Treaty, Sir John Rose set out in January -1871. His instruc­
tions stated that Her Majesty’s Government were "very desirous 
of obtaining a correct insight into the state of public feeling 
in the United Stategr towards this country generally and more 
specifically with regard to the questions which are still 
pending between the two countries", in regard to which "Her 
Majesty’s Government would gladly find means of removing any 
causes of difference...and you will not go beyond their inten­
tions if, though professing to speak only your own private sen­
timents, you freely express your conviction that any fair or 
reasonable opening which ghe United States should afford,would
be readily met in a corresponding spirit by.the government of 
i ■
Her Majesty". By 3 February, 1871, the arrangement was com­
plete and passed into official channels, but throughout the 
proceeding Sir Jo#n had been treated as an envoy by the United 
States Government.
All the information given to the; public concerning this 
negotiation was contained in four notes which passed between 
the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, and the American 
Secretary Hamilton Fish.^ These notes were written strictly 
for publication and were worked out after the negotiation was
1. Granville to Rose, No.1, Confidential, 19 Dec.1870 (F.O. 
5/1298).
2. North America No.l (1871). [C.262], H,C.(l87l), LXX.3-5.
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concluded. Thornton even went so far as to predate them, on 
his own responsibility, since he hoped that the negotiation 
would thereby be speeded up.! The result of these manoeuvres 
was that the notes bore no relation to the negotiations which 
had taken place, but were simply a summary of the conclusions 
reached. . .
On the whole the Ministry felt it incumbent upon them to 
produce information. TJhen important issues arose they were 
sensitive to the demands of Parliament and the country. At 
the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, Lyons wrote that 
"Above all things we must try to keep as much as possible out 
of Blue Books",2 but Granville replied: "Blue Book is absolutely 
necessary, and promised - and the public will be impatient of 
delay - Please look over our correspondence so as to be pre­
pared when a proof arrives for your observations. Use your 
own discretion as to consulting Gramont but don’t let him ob­
ject to anything that may be material."^ In the event very 
little was omitted from this first Blue Book on the Franco-
1. Thornton to Granville, No.52, 6 Feb.1871 (F.O.5/1297). When 
it became necessary to produce the Blue Book, Hammond, always 
concerned with constitutional propriety, wrote to Granville: 
"The cooking of dates between Thornton and Fish will, I fear, 
give occasion.for much comment by ingenious hole-pickers; for 
Jany. 26 Thornton says he acted on instructions which were 
only sent on FebF.l." Hammond therefore suggested a despatch
to cover the situation which became No.2 of the Blue Book.
2. Newton, Life of Lord Lyons. i.300.
3. Granville to Lyons, 17 July 1870 (F.0.362/4); Pte. Grahville
Papers. . .
SB
Prussian war,! somewhat to Lyons’ surprise, the French 
Government did not object to it.2 The second Blue Book on 
this subject and the one on the Benedetti Treaty were laid 
before the recess, and as early as October 1870 the third was 
printing# Hammond made the selection, "throwing out all the 
fighting and trash, and keeping to the political only"#^ it 
was obviously intended to inform Parliament as soon as it met, 
since he went- on to say that "the papers must be hastened" if 
there were any idea of an autumn session#
In the course of the American negotiations, the British • 
Government were placed in some difficulty by the attitude of 
the United States Government which was alternately indiscreet 
and over-secretive# When it became necessary to compile a 
Blue Book on the Washington Conference the British Government 
were somewhat disturbed to find that the United States Com­
missioners adhered to their first intention not to publish
A
anything except the Protocols/* Hammond declared that "it 
would be an insult to Parliament" to publish the Protocols 
alone, and finally some modifications were agreed to by the 
United States with the result that the final Protocols con­
tained a ’statement’ or summary of the negotiations.5
— —  *
1. Franco-Prussian War No.l (1870)^FC.1671 ^ H.C.(1S70), LXX.17-100.
2. Lyons to Granville, Private, 29 July 1870 (G.& D. 29/85).
3. Hammond to Granville, Private, 17 Oct.1870 (G.&D. 29/104).
4. 7. supra, p. 41* '
5. North America No.3 (l87l). 10.3463, H.C.(l87l), LXX.3^-^
This recognition of the necessity of giving adequate in­
formation was modified by the practice of leaving out the 
different types of material which have been mentioned, and 
also on one or two occasions by questions of policy. The 
first Blue Book on the Alabama question, for instance, con­
tains as its first entry a despatch from Stanley to Thornton 
of 15 February, 1 8 6 8 . Considerable correspondence took 
place in the Foreign Office, concerning the publication of 
the despatch, since it recorded a conversation with the Ameri­
can Ambassador Adams, who had not completely fulfilled the in­
structions given by the American Secretary in the despatch 
which he communicated. Hammond wished to suppress the des­
patch since it seemed to imply that Adams had not fulfilled 
his instructions, but Abbott,% Clarendon, and Stanley agreed 
that consideration for his position should give way to the 
question of policy since the passages of the despatch which 
had not been communicated (by comparison with papers published
1. North America No.l (1869), [4144], H.C.(1868-9), LXIII.739.
2. Charles Stuart Aubrey Abbott entered the Foreign Office as 
a clerk in 1854. He was precis-writer to Lord Stanley from 
1866-8 and during that time was in attendance on the Royal 
Commission on Neutrality Laws and served as secretary to ' 
the Royal Commission on Naturalisation. He succeeded to 
the title of Baron Tenterden on 10 April, 1870, and was 
subsequently secretary to the High Commission at Washington 
and British Agent at the Geneva tribunal. He became Per­
manent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs on 10 October, 
1873. (Foreign Office List, 1882, p.
in thé United States) contained a very strong demand for in­
demnification of individual citizens as compensation for the 
national wrong inflicted by our behaviour during the war.1 
Abbott insisted it should be made clear that because of the 
non-communication of the extract Stahley could not appreciate 
the position which Mr. Seward had taken up.
Secondly the well-established practice of consulting'; 
foreign governments before laying papers could be used to ad­
vantage by jbhe British Government when necessary. Having 
prepared the Blue Book on the Black Sea question, omitting’ 
considerable quantities of material of a vague character which ■ 
had been suggested at one time or another in the course of the 
negotiations, Granville telegraphed to Bloomfield: "In answer 
to a possible charge of cooking the papers, I wish to be able 
to say that I have omitted nothing but what you were of opinion 
ought to be omitted. Inform me if you think any are omitted 
which.ought to be r e t a i n e d . T h i s  Blue Book was the only ' 
one to be violently attacked in Parliament, because of the use. 
of extract form. The attacks were possible because the index 
had not been altered to suit the omissions from the despatches.^
1. Abbott memo., 22 May 1869 (F.O.5/1330);
Hammond to Clarendon, 23 May 1869 (P.O.5/1330);
Clarendon to Hammond, 23 May 1869 (f .0.5/1330);
Abbott memo., 24 May 1869 (P.O.5/1330). " -
2. Granville to Bloomfield, 30 Jan.1371 (P.O.362/2); Pte. Gran­
ville Papers.
3* Temperley and Penson, on.cit.. p.218.
A nhte by Granville which seems to be the draft of a Parlia­
mentary answer is in the Gladstone Papers, dated 30 March,
1871, the day of the debate. This explains that the Proto­
cols of the Conference "give only a faint idea of the diffi­
culties of the negotiation. It is not usual to produce the 
correspondence of a negotiation which is successful. Other­
wise a mass of papers would show how difficult it was to come 
to an exact agreement upon the most important points." On 
the charge of "garbling papers" Granville wrote: "None of the 
Turkish and Austrian correspondence was omitted from the Blue 
Book excepting after communication with our Ambassadors at 
Vienna and Constantinople, and after the expressed opinion of 
the Austrian and Turkish Ambassadors here in favour of the 
omission." In the event this statement was not used in the 
debate, the details of which will be discussed later, but it 
seems that consultation with foreign governments was in this 
case, at least partly, a pretext. It was scarcely necessary 
since the Houses were almost always willing to accept the 
statement that papers were ’confidential*.
The use of private correspondence naturally precluded any 
possibility of presentation to Parliament. This correspondence 
falls into two main groups, that of the Foreign Secretary with 
British ambassadors abroad and that of the Foreign Secretary
1. B.M., Add.MS 44168, fos,87-89.  ^ '
7with ambassadors in London. The former class seems to have 
had, as its chief purpose, the maintenance of closer relations 
between the Secretary of State and British representatives 
abroad th&n was possible through the formal medium of des­
patches. Clarendon and Granville carried on an extensive 
correspondence with ambassadors, but since this was by 1868 
part of the normal routine, these letters do not usually add 
very much to the information which can be derived from the of­
ficial correspondence.
Occasionally, however, the private letter could be very 
useful, and Clarendon used this method for the delicate dis­
armament negotiations which preceded the Franco-Prussian war.! 
The French wished to make these negotiations public in order 
to discredit Prussia, but Clarendon insisted th&t secrecy was 
more likely to get results. The long-term effect of the use 
of private letters was that when Granville succeeded Clarendon
in office there was no means whereby he could have any official
2 - ^ ..
knowledge of what had passed, and therefore no reason why the 
negotiations should have reached the light of day, even if 
Clarendon had been succeeded by a secretary who wished to
1. Newton. Life of Lord Lyons, i. ch.7.
2. On 19 July 1870 Granville wrote to Lyons: "I remember Cla­
rendon saying something to me about the subject" (disarma­
ment). "The less I know about it the better, further than
-I know Clarendon was always looking out for opportunities 
to promote disarmament." (F.O.362/4; Pte. Granville Papers).
discredit him by publication.
Correspondence between the Foreign Secretary and ambassa­
dors resident in London usually concerned the details of some 
part of a negotiation. This was especially the case with 
the Black Sea question where the details of what was to be 
done at the Conference were arranged beforehand in private 
correspondence between Granville and Brunnow.^
On the whole, it cannot be said that the omissions from 
Blue Books, or the use of private papers, misled Parliament 
in any vital particular. Their general tendency was to con­
ceal the difficulties of negotiation, and thus put the Ministry 
in a worse light than might otherwise have been the case. The 
omission of the general despatches, those which dealt broadly 
with the policy or attitude of foreign governments, was not 
such as to mislead anyone genuinely interested in foreign 
affairs, since these factors dould:almost always be deduced 
from the course of events. For instance, diplomatic specu­
lation as to whether there was an alliance between Russia and 
Prussia, giving rise to the Gortchakov circular, was omitted 
from the Blue Book, yet the idea was freely canvassed in both 
Houses. . ■
The debate on the Black Sea question clearly shows that
- V; ■ '
the power of omission which the government possessed was a
1. Granville to Brunnow, (G.& B. 29/115; Pte. Granville Papers);
Brunnow to Granville, (G.& D. 29/98; Pte. Granville Parers).
5^weapon easily turned against the user* Sir Charles Dilke 
eritioised the extensive use of extract form, but the examples 
he gave in the House, and the deductions made from them, were 
erroneous and unfair to the government. For instancO, re­
ferring to an "extract five lines long", indexed as "rumours 
and opinions at St. Petersburg", Dilke asserted that the go- ' 
vernment were afraid to print Buchanan’s views on "what was 
said or thought in Russia". ' He went on to say: "I can tell 
the House what was the opinion at St. Petersburg, and that was 
that England had agreed to a Conference in order that it might 
attempt to save its honour by a farcical formality."! The 
despatch actually read: "The first impression apparent in 
Society here is not favourable to the step which has been taken, 
and people talk freely of Prince Gortchakoff’s having been in­
discreet and clumsy in his treatment of the question." Dilke’s 
reference to the "ridiculous abortion", No.lOl of the Blue 
Book, was equally astray.% The seconder of the motion, S.A. 
Beaumont, suggested two expedients which the government should 
have tried, namely to obtain some equivalent to the neutralisa­
tion satisfactory to Turkey; mr to obtain the accession of 
Prussia to the Tripartite Treaty.3 Attempts had been made
1. Hans., CCV.S99.
2. Ibid.. 911. As the Blue Book extract indicated, Austria in 
fact refused to encourage unofficial requests for help from 
the Porte. Bloomfield to Granville, No.203, Confidential,
24 Nov.1870; and No.219, Confidential, 4 Dec.1870 (F.O.7/769).
3. Hans.. CCY.916-8.
to obtain both these ■ objects, but they had failed and were 
therefore excluded from the Blue Book. Having once omitted 
these pieces of information, however, the government could 
not defend themselves, and so were placed in a false position.
The position of Parliament was that, as a rule, they 
knew very little about the genesis of a diplomatic transaction, 
and very little about the influences which moulded its "course, 
but they did have a reasonably full and accurate outline of 
the decisions actually.taken from time to time. :
6!
Chapter III.
THE POSSIBILITY OF INFLUENCE THEOUGH DEBATES. : .
On the whole it cannot he maintained that Parliament was 
precluded from exercising an influence on the conduct of foreign 
policy by the insufficiency of Blue Book information. The real 
limiting factor was that of time. By 1868 two general prin­
ciples had been evolved concerning the stage of a diplomatic 
transaction before which a Blue Book should not be produced. 
Firstly it was the practice not to lay papers describing the 
course of a negotiation until it had been concluded. Secondly, 
a treaty, was not laid until it had been ratified. The Foreign 
Office had these rules at its disposal whenever it seemed ad­
visable to prevent Parliamentary interference.
_ If the rules had been strictly observed, the result in 
every case would have been the postponement of informed debate 
until Parliament had been presented with a fait accompli. 
Parliament’s influence over the executive in such internal 
matters, however, was still strong enough to prevent this being
invariably the case. - :  ..
The probable consequences of rigid adherence to the rules 
were illustrated by the collapse of the debate on Sir Charles 
Dilke’s motion on the Black Sea question. Two Blue Books . 
were produced. The first, containing the correspondence
preceding the meeting of the London Conference, was laid on 
the first day of the session (10 February, 1871).! The con­
ference was then in progress and concluded on 14 March, the 
Treaty having been ®igned the previous day. On the l6th a 
Blue Book was laid containing the protocols of the conference, 
and although the Treaty itself, not having been ratified, was
not produced, the text of it was embodied in the protocols and
2 -
available to members.
Sir Charles Dilke’s motion was debated on the 30th of 
March. Although, in form, the motion was an attack on the 
action taken by the Government in November 1870,^ Dilke’s 
speech made it clear that he considered the result a foregone 
conclusion, the conference having once been agreed to. The 
mntion therefore really represents an attack on all the policy 
up to the signing of the new treaty, which was of comparatively 
recent date. Yet Dilke’s motion received very little support, 
the general feeling being that there was no chance of altering 
the result, and that the whole matter should be allowed to drop 
as quickly and quietly as possible. Granville’s memorandum.
1. Correspondence respecting Treaty of Paris (1856) Tc.245l.
H.C. (1871), LXXII.1-H4.
2. Protocols of London Con ferancea [0.2671 , H.C. (1871), LXXII. 
119— 164.
3. "That this House regrets that Her Majesty’s Government accep­
ted a proposition for the assembling of a Conference under 
the circumstances disclosed in the Papers relating to Prince 
Gortchakof’s Circular note, which have been laid before Par­
liament" (Hans.. CCV.918).
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written on the day of the debate, was not used.! The Govern­
ment had no need to defend the Blue Books, since the House took 
no\ notice of Bilke’s attack. Gladstone did not find it ne­
cessary to take any part and left Enfield to reply for the 
Government. -
- It is always a little difficult to judge from Hansard what 
the ’feeling* of the House in fact was. This debate is per­
haps not quite such a clear illustration of the Commons’ atti­
tude to ex post facto criticism as might appear at first sight. 
Various factors contributed to the resounding defeat of the • 
motion, which were actually unrelated to it. In the first 
place, in order to bring on the motion, it had been necessary 
to pèstpone the Licensing Bill and other legislation which 
members had much at heart. Secondly the mover’s speech did 
not seem to strike the right note, and Sir Robert Peel parti­
cularly attacked his frequent use of long quotations from 
Russian newspapers.2 Finally, as Sir Charles Dilke himself 
admitted,3 ne made an error of judgement in attempting to with­
draw his motion. The House was incensed at this trifling with 
a motion which had been brought forward as a vote of censure. 
Dilke was attacked from all sides, and Bern&al Osborne seems to
i. Cf. supra, p . SU. 2. Hans. , CCV.953.
3. Cf. 8.Gwynnc and G.M.Tuckwell, Life of Sir Charles Dilke. i .
' 115-22: "I ought to have divided, even if I had been in a 
minority of one, for the proposal to withdraw my motion 
brought a hornet’s nest about my ears, and was a parliamen­
tary mistake."
6*
have expressed the feell&g of the House when he declared: "I 
have never been called on to come down and give a vote under 
a greater sham, or upon a greater pretence than I have been 
called upon on this occasion... Why have we been called down ; 
here on the Eve of the Easter holidays to preside at-a dead 
horse being flogged?"! ; "
It is somewhat difficult to determine how much of the 
opposition to the motion arose from a feeling of exasperation 
arising from one or other of these three factors, yet it seems 
likely that, had the House felt any real interest in the sub­
ject, the errors made by Dilke would not have prevented the 
motion receiving reasonable consideration. However that may 
be, the result for the Foreign Office was the same. Two days 
after the debate, Grahville wrote to Lyons: "Our foreign office 
debates have ended well for us. The Speaker wrote to me that 
he never remembered such a storm of scorn and contempt as that 
in which Dilke’s motion was snuffed out.
1. Hans.. CCV.973-4.
2. Granville to Lyons, X Apr.1871 (F.O.362/2, Pte.Granville 
Papers). Of. Speaker Denison to Granville, 31 March 1871
(Gw and D. 23/75): "You will hardly make out by the newspaper 
reports how signal was the defeat of Sir C. Dilke last night. 
The noise was just upon a par with the presumption of the 
mover. The thing enàéd under a storm of scorn and contempt 
wh. I have never seen equalled.
"I had a slight hand in this. Disraeli came by my chair 
at 11 and I said. Cannot you help me to bring this to an end. 
He said - We were all brought here to hear a speech from Mr. 
Otway. I said - But Mr. Otway tells me he has such a bad 
headache that he cannot speak tonight. Then why should we 
not finish at once with Ld. Enfield’s speech said Disraeli - 
I don’t wish to speak unless Mr. Gladstone makes it necesssry. 
"mien Enfield sat down, who spoke well and shortly, Otway
It seems probable that a similar impatience would have 
been the normal result of debate in any case where the issue 
was, in fact, closed, and Parliamentary speeches could no longer 
have any effect. But very few issues were so sharply defined 
as the Black Sea question. The general questions of British 
policy towards Turkey and Russia were not.in dispute, the point, 
at issue being simply the neutralisation of the Black Sea. 
Indeed, in the Foreign Office view, the question was not even 
as broad as that, but was concerned merely with the form in 
which the issue had been raised.
The strict rule of laying papers only after the conclusion 
of a negotiation was adhered to in only one other case, which 
was quite different. This was in connection with the Central 
Asian question, where general questions of policy had been 
raised and left open. The Granville-Gortchakov negotiations 
on Central Asfia concluded with agreement on 5 February, 1873, 
and the Blue Book was laid the next day.! Thereafter, a few 
questions were asked in the Comraonâ on points of detail, and 
a second Blue Book was laid on 10 March, including all the
moved the adjournment.; The House wd, not hear of it. Then 
Dilke wanted to backaout, down ce.me Osborne on his back, his 
motion was negatived without a Division, under such [a] storm 
of scorn and contempt as he w o n ’t get over very soon.
"The Quicksilver of the Foreign Office had been rising 
steadily through the evening and now stands at Set Fair."
!* Central Asia No.l (1873) CC.699J, H.C.(1873), LXXV.693-712.
previous correspondence from 1868-1873, Even then, no debate 
took place until 22 April/ presumably because It .'was-nêoèssary 
for E.B. Eastwick to give notice of his motion for a priv&te 
members' night. In this respect, there was likely to be a 
greater delay before debate took place if the negotiation had 
been generally satisfactory to the House than.if it had not, 
for in the latter case, notice would have been given of a vote 
of censure, which would always come on earlier than a private 
member's motion moved according to the ordinary rules.^
Thé lapse of time in this case had no.adverse effect on 
the interest of the subject, and a long debate took place on 
general questions concerning the North-West Frontier, and Bri­
tish relations with Russia in Central Asia.3 ,,lu general, 
members approved in outline the policy of the Government, and 
the effect of such a debate must have been to strengthen the 
hand of a government engaged on the continuation of such a
1. Central Asia No.2 (1873) CC.704], H.C.(1873), B%ZV.7l3ff.
It seems that this was laid in response to Parliamentary 
request, since on 14 February Enfield explained that cer­
tain papers asked for by Dilke "would.form part of the Pa­
pers relating to the Question of the hon. Member for Penrhyn 
%Mr. Eastwick)" (Sans.. CCXIV.439), but I have been unable 
to discover any question ot motion to which this statement 
could refer. ?
2. This was the usual practice, but in 1872 Gladstone claimed 
some discretion in -the matter and refused "to be bound...to 
the doctrine that every Motion to be made in th& House which 
the Government may regard as involving a Vote of Censure is 
therefore^to receive precedence of all other business" (Hans.. 
CCXI.1282).  '
3. Ibid..-CCXV.818-77. .
policy.!
The more usual practice of the Foreign Office was to lay 
Blue Books at stages of a negotiation, as in the case of the 
long negotiations with the United States, and the rapidly- 
moving, concentrated negotiations arising from the Franco- 
Prussian war. In many cases, the stages at which Blue Books 
were laid were not conclusive, and Parliament was then in a 
better position to exert influence on the next steps to be 
taken.  ^ " -
The Blue Books on the Franco-Prussian war are not good 
examples of this practice of laying by stages. Events moved 
too quickly, and the first Blue Books were out of date before 
they reached the hands of members. The negotiation of the
on oHie#
Washington Treaty, and the events arising from it ,^resembled 
in many cases a series of separate negotiations. '
The first two Blue Books in this period. North America No.l 
of 1869^ and North America No.l of 1870,^ covered the two un-' 
successful attempts at reaching agreement on the questions 
arising from-the civil war, made by Lord Clarendon and the
1. The fact that the House was satisfied with policy in Central 
Asia can be seen from a comparison of this debate with one 
which took place on. 9 July, 1669 (Hans.. CXCYII. 1544-82).
Both were opened by the same member with an address for papers. 
Then the same members spoke in the same order (although a few 
more took part at the end of the debate in 1873 than in 1869). 
The speeches were very similar, too; in 1873 Graht Buff, 
Under-Secretary for India, even quoted about 400 words from the 
speech he had made in 1869.
2. C4144] H.C.(1868-9), LXIII.735-96.
3. CC.223 H.C.(1870), LXIX.439-62.
American Minister in London, Reverdy Johnson. The.failure 
of the negotiations in each case caused public opinion to 
become more embittered than it had been before the attempt was 
made. As a result of this, both Houses refrained from deba­
ting the issues Involved, at least partly at the request of 
the Government, in order to allow tempers to calm.
The negotiations conducted by Sir John Rose, which resul­
ted in the appointment of Commissioners to agree to a treaty 
prescribing methods for reaching a settlement of the questions 
at issue between the two countries,; took place during recess 
in 1370. % e n  Parliament met on 10 February, 1871, they were 
informed that this agreement had been reached, and the Thornton- 
Fish correspondence was laid on 23 February.! Thereafter, 
presumably influenced by the earlier^failures, the Government 
refused to allow discussion in Parliament.- On 20 April, Gran­
ville declared bluntly,in answer to a question, that it had 
been agreed "to keep the negotiations secret until some result 
- one way or the other - is obtained".&
On 8 May, 1871, the treaty was signed at Washington. Next 
day, the House of Commons was informed of this fact, but no 
further information was given,^ and Granville telegraphed to 
the Commissioners to ask when the United States Government
1. North America No.1(1871) IC.262], H.C.(1871), LXX.1-8.
2. Hans., CCV.1382.
3. Ibid., CC7I.471.
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intended to publish the Treaty.! Lord Tenterden, the secre­
tary to the negotiating commission, replied the same day that 
he had "seen Mr. Fish who says that the U.S. Government will 
not publish either Treaty or Protocols until after the Senate 
have come to a conclusion on the subject; but it is possible 
that when once the treaty is in the hands of the Senators it 
may get into the newspapers. If it does I will telegraph to 
your Lordship at once. .The substance is pretty well known now 
but it would not be advisable for you to publish anything offi-
a  -
cially at present." The British Government therefore con­
tinued to refuse information to Parliament,^ but on 11 May the 
Treaty was published in the New York Times.& and the next day 
in the British press.5
Granville promptly wrote a disapproving despatch, saying 
that "Her Majesty's Government were scarcely prepared for the 
premature publication of the Treaty in the 'New York Times' of 
yesterday, as stated in your telegram received this morning.
Her Majesty's Government presume that after the assurance given 
to you by Mr.“ Fish that the U.S. Government would not publish 
the Treaty until after the Senate had come to a conclusion on
1. Granville to Commissioners, Tel. NÔ.105, 3 May 1871 (F.O.5/ 
1299).
2. Commissioners to Granville, Tel. Private No.l, 9 May 1871. 
(F.O.5/1304). ' '
3. Hans., CCVI. 620— 1, 698— 701. ■
4. Be Grey to Granville, Tel.-Private No.3, 11 May 1871 (F.O.5/ 
1304 / .
5. Times, 12 May,5c.
the subject^ the publication has hot been.made with the autho­
rity of the government, but it places Her Majesty's Government 
in a position of no small embarrassment, since they have not 
received a complete copy of the Articles of the Treaty and are 
therefore unable to answer the enquiries.almost daily made to 
tkem in Parliament for information on the subject of its con­
tents. in order to save time, which was represented to be 
important, Her Majesty's Government were content to receive, 
in the imperfect shape in which it could be conveyed by tele­
gram, the general purport of the Articles which were to be em­
bodied in the Treaty, but they certainly had expeifcted to have 
in their possession a textual copy of the Treaty before pub­
licity was given to it in the United States, and, through the 
American newspapers, in England.
Amongst Granville's private papers is a note from Hammond 
dated 13 May, 1871, which explains that "the standing rule is 
that a Treaty cannot be properly presented as such till the 
ratifications are exchanged - for in point of fact it is not 
a Treaty till that has been done. We have occasionally, as, 
specifically, in t h e ,case of the late Chinese Convention, and 
that of the Black Sea, published the articles agreed upon, but 
there were special considerations in those cases; and similar 
circumstances aÿply to the present case; for the Treaty has
1. Granville to Commissioners, Ho.115, 12.May 1871 (P.O.5/1299).
i;
been published in the U.S. and we could not reasonably refuse 
to publish it here"#^ A Cabinet was held the same day,^ and 
whether or not this, matter was discussed, Gladstone afterwards 
informed the Commons that the Treaty v/ould be laid immediately 
it arrived, without waiting for ratification.3
On 19 May, Earl Russell postponed his motion, at the re­
quest of the Duke of Richmond, in order to give time for the 
papers to be laid.^ Thereupon Salisbury asked whether the 
Government intended to proceed with ratification before the 
motion was called, claiming that Gladstone's statement amounted 
to "a constructive pledge" to await the decision of Parliament. 
Granville refused to answer^this question without notice,^ and 
Salisbury repeated it on Monday, the 22nd. Granville then 
denied that Gladstone's answer could be interpreted as a pledge 
to accept any decision of the House.
; The fact remains that Earl Russell's motion was debated 
on June 12th before the Treaty was ratified. In farm,jthe
1. Hammond to Granville, 13 May 1871 (G. and D. 29/104), Pte. 
Granville Papers. ' '
2. Times. 13 May, ^ 9#f. ; 15 May,; 44^*' ■
3. Monday, 15 May 1871. It is curious that this Question and 
Answer are not reported in Hansard. ' ; There is a report in 
the Simes. 16 May, 7a, but when Granville quoted Gladstone's 
statement, it was rather different from the Times report.
4. Times. 20 May, 6a. There is no indication whether Richmond 
was acting in the interests of the Opposition or upon a 
request from the Government.
5. This incident -does not appear in Hansard or the Times, but
. its history was given in the Lords on the 22nd (Hans.. CCYI. 
1101-8).
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motion was a direction to the Government not to agree to any 
treaty under which Britain would he judged by rules of inter­
national law which had not actually been in force when the
± "
'Alabama* sailed.
There seems little doubt that, in spite of the undoubted 
right at the Crown to ratify treaties without reference to 
Parliament, the passing of such a vote would have resulted in 
the abrogation of the Treaty, had it been supported by both 
Houses. This power of influencing the executive by a direct 
vote had been won by Parliament from the Crown. On the other 
hand, the development of party politics by this time had again 
removed this power from Parliament and returned it to the hands 
of the Ministry. The Earl of Derby summed up the situation 
in the course of the debate in these words: "I apprehend it is 
almost certain, in the existing state of political parties, 
that a question of this kind being vital to the existence of 
a Ministry, and being treated, as this undoubtedly would be, 
as one of confidence in the House of Commons, not only this
1. "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying 
ihat Her Majesty will be pleased not to sanction or to ratify
 ............  * - j
or
d
other than the law of nations and and the municipal law of 
the United kingdom existing and in force at the period of - 
the late civil war in the United States when the alleged 
depredations took place" (Hans.. GCVI.1838).
Treaty but any Treaty would obtain the approval that was asked 
from that Assembly. The only effect of our Resolution, if 
carried, would be that it would serve as a protest, but as a 
protest without result, while the House of Commons would have 
been compelled to give, at least in appearance, its express 
approval to an arrangement of which probably the majority of 
its Members think much as the noble Earl [Russell] does."^
Lord Cairns reinforced the conclusion that the motion 
could not be accepted, on the ground that the form of "full 
powers" given to the Commissioners made the Treaty already "in 
honour and honesty,^ as binding upon the country as if the ra­
tifications had been actually e x c h a n g e d " . ^
‘ ' The consequence of these opinions was that although the
Lords used the opportunity of the motion to criticise past 
policy, they were precluded from affecting the future, which 
at that time appeared to be a simple issue of the ratification 
or non-ratification of the Treaty. Granville was satisfied 
with the tone of the debate and telegraphed to Thornton: "De­
bate in House of Lords last night was long but satisfactory.
No serious objection was made by the opposition and the feeling 
was general that Lord Russell's motion against the ratification 
of the Treaty with the rules was out of place."3
i. Hans.,-CCYI.1855-6. 2. Ibid.: col.1882.
3. Granville to Thornton, Tel. No.150, 13 June-1871 (E.0.5/1296).
  It was not until 4 August that debate took place in the
Commons. Then it may be said to have arisen directly from 
the last Blue Book. North America No.3 , which had been laid 
on 2 June, containing the Instructions to the Commizssioners 
and the Protocols of the Conference.1 The motion was for 
the Correspondence with the Commissioners, which had been 
omitted as the result of a specific agreement with the United 
States. The motion itself was : firmly opposed by Sir Stafford 
Northcote and withdrawn at the end of the debate. The motion 
was, however, .an opportunity for general criticism, and of this 
aspect the mover, Sir Charles Adderley, said he "greatly re­
gretted the delay which had occurred in that House having an 
opportunity of expressing its opinion on the Washington Treaty. 
It was, however/ better that the House should_ express an opi­
nion on that Treaty even now, than that it should express no 
opinion upon it at all. If the House were to take no notice 
whatever of the late Washington Treaty" it would appear that 
"the House of Commons had apparently given its perfect satis­
faction by total silence".2 This state of things was avoided, 
but at that stage in events, the House.had no opportunity for
1. North America No.3 (1871) [C.34G], H.C,(1871), LXX,25-44.
2. Hans., CEVIII.862. Disraeli explained the next session that 
the opposition had remained silent because "they could not 
interfere with any effect" and d M  not wish to indulge in 
"captious erf H e  isms" (Hans., CCIX.65).
suggesting future lines of action, and immediately afterwards 
came the adjournment for the summer recess.
Ifhen Parliament reassembled in 1872 it was known that the 
United States had put forward the indirect claims which Britain 
considered inadmissible. These were claims for damages in 
respect of the increased premiums on insurance, the prolonga­
tion of the war, and the loss of carrying trade, alleged to 
have been caused by the activities of the 'Alabama*. The 
'Cases* drawn up on behalf of both governments had been sent 
to the Times on 1 January^ and had been frequently discussed 
in its columns. .By the end of the month public criticism was 
such that Hammond wrote to Granville: "I am getting anxious
about the American business, and I judge from the Papers that % 
the question which at the meeting of Parliament, [the] : Govern­
ment will be expected to answer will be, - what notice yw  have 
taken of the exaggerated American demands. Sooner or later 
you will have to declare that they are beyond the reference to 
arbitration and you will not go to arbitration on them or sub­
mit to an adverse award. It seems to me that the sooner this 
is done the better, - you will stand clearer with Parliament 
and the Country, and you will cut from under the Americans any 
ground for the assumption that by abstaining up to the meeting 
of the arbitrators from protesting, you had in some way admitted
1. Tenterden memo., 1 Jan.1872 (G. and D. 29/106:-Pte. Granville 
Papers).
lb
that'-the question might be entertained by them... If the Amer­
icans insist then we should it once withdraw from the arbitra-
- - . ■ . » 
tion and it would be much better to do so at once, than reject
an award, if adverse,/when made."^
Tenterden opposed Hammond’s view on the ground that such 
a declaration at the opening of Parliament would stir up trouble 
in the United States, where a presidential election was immi­
nent. He feared that anti-British feeling would be magnified 
into a ’cry’ during the election and result in a worsening of 
Anglè-American relations,^ He followed up this argument in a 
letter to Granville the next day, saying: "It will no doubt
have occurred to you that if anything is written now the oppo­
sition will say that the Government have incurred the imputation 
of neglecting to take any steps in regard to the American claims 
until aroused by the newspapers. Whereas if notice is given 
hereafter through the means of the Arbitration Agent, the Go­
vernment can say that that was the policy determined upon from 
the first, when the case was received at Geneva.
Tenterden maintained this view during the next two days, 
attempting to prevent a diplomatic move, or any suggestion that 
Britain would withdraw from the arbitration, because in this
1. Hammond to Granville, 30 Jan.1872 (G. and D. 29/105; Pte.
- Granville Pacers)i -
2. Tenterden to Granville, 30 Jan.1372 (G. and D. 29/106; Pte. 
Granville Pacers).
3. Ibid., 1 Feb.1872.
n1
way he thought Britain might put America in the wrong.
It seems therefore that the "friendly communication" of 
3 February, 1872,^ was written as a sop to public opinion.
It represents a compromise between the views of Hammond and 
those of Tenteôden, in that it contained a protest against the 
insertion of the indirect claims into the American case, but 
no mention of Britain’s intentions as to future action.
It is clear that the Government were worried by the wide­
spread criticism of the American action and of the diplomatic 
situation generally. Particularly they were concerned about 
the effect this criticism might have on Anglo-American relations. 
On 4 February, Granville telegraphed to Thornton: " % a t  im- .
pression in America has been produced by the outbreak of in- . 
dignation here at the American case? And what in your opinion 
will be the result of the protest of which I sent you notice?"^ 
Thornton replied: "The general impression here has been that
the tone of the press in England and elsewhere in Europe has 
been inspired by Her Majesty’s Government, in order to influence 
the minds of the Arbitrators with a view to the greatest possible 
reduction of the amount of damages,", As to the "friendly com­
munication" Thornton felt that the "U.S. Government would
1 . .Memos., 1 Feb./ 2.Feb., 1872 (G. and D. 29/106).
North America No.7 (1872) CO.545], Ho.1, -H.C.(1872), LXIX.655. 
3. Recorded in Thornton to Granville, No.60, 4 Feb.1872 (F.0.5/
; 1393). ■ - - '
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positively refuse to reform its case or enter upon a fresh 
negotiation. The U.S. arbitrator would be withdravm, the 
treaty would be at and end, and there would be great soreness 
and a bitter feeling against us in this country.
In spite of ".this, Hammond was still concerned with the 
Parliamentary position, and pressing for. a more determined atti­
tude to satisf&y public opinion. With the opening of Parlia» 
ment only,two days away, apparently.the Queen’s Speech on this 
point had not yet been decided, for he wrote to Granville on 
4 February: "I.trust that if the Queen’s Speech alludes to the
arbitration difficulty, it will do so in more precise and dis­
tinct terms than it is alluded to in the note to Schenck... I 
fear that neither Parliament nor the country will be satisfied 
with the mere expression of an opinion on the part of Her Ma­
jesty’s Government that it is." not within the province of the 
Tribunal of arbitration at Geneva to decide upon the claims for 
indirect losses. As far as I can gather from the newspapers, 
what is expected of [the] government is that they should dis­
tinctly state they will not go on with the arbitration if these 
preposterous claims are laid before the Tribunal."2
Bouwimdod failed to carry his point. The Speech from the • 
Throne stated simply that "in the case.;; „subMtted on behalf of
1. Thornton to Granville, No.61, 4Feb.l872 (F.0.5/1393).
2. Hammond to Granville, 4 Feb.1872 (G. and D. 29/105; Pte.
Granville Papers).
nthe United States large claims have been included which.are 
understood on my part not to be within the province of the 
Arbitrators. 0n this subject I have'caused a friendly com­
munication to be made to the Government of the United States."* 
The debate on the Address went off quietly enough in the 
House of Lords, but in the Commons, Disraeli justified all 
Hammond's fears. He not only attacked the inadequacy of the 
p a r a g r a p h , 2 hut also took up Tenterden*s point about the date 
of the British note of 3 February.^ The other speakers in the 
debate, however, both on 6 February and the next night on the 
Report of the Address, did not take up these points, but con­
fined themselves to criticism of the Treaty,and to the ratifi­
cation question. Possibly, this was the result of the reply 
made by Gladstone to Disraeli's criticisms. His defence was 
that the despatch of 3 February and the paragraph in the Speech 
were "adequate to the emergency, in the sense of being adequate 
to the time at which, the circumstances under which, and the 
persons by whom, it is offered",& and later he said: "I believe
that declaration to be adequate for the first word in this 
matter, but I am far from saying that it will also be adequate 
for the last word."^
Having survived the debate on the Address, the Government
1. Hans., CGIX.4. ' 2. Ibid.. col.60.
3. Ibid. . cols.68-9. 4. Ibid., col.78.
5. Ibid.. col.85.
had little cause for further anxiety concerning Parliament.
The next six months provided a phenomenal example of Parlia­
mentary restraint, on a subject which was, after all, because : 
of its financial implications, of particular interest to the 
House of Commons. Had the question been a purely diplomatic 
one, the silence of the Lower House might have been explained 
by its traditional disinclination to devote very much time to 
foreign policy, while the Lords maintained reticence from their 
usual strong sense of responsibility in such questions* But 
this question involved financial issues, and on a large scale. 
The Commons were well aware of this fact, as was demonstrated 
during the debate on the Queen's Speech. Yet it seems incre­
dible that they were really prepared to rely on Osborne's 
proposal that they should ultimately refuse to pay any award 
that might be made, meanwhile allowing the Government to 
continue negotiations which might cost the country several 
millions of pounds. Yet this was what, in fact, happened, 
and it must be regarded as a testimony to Gladstone's control 
of the House and to the strength of party discipline that this 
was so.
The battle began on 12 February when Sir F.H. Goldsmid 
asked for the 'Cases' presented by the two Governments.^ Pre­
vious telegraphic enquiry had supplied the.answer^ and the
1. Hans., CGIX.98-9. 2. Ibid.. col.207.
3. Recorded in Thornton to Granville, Nos. 81 and 82, 10 Feb.
1872 (F.0.5/1393).
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American case Tjas refused on technical grounds, but the British 
case was laid as North America No.l on 15 February, 1872. 
Meanwhile on the l3th, Lord Redesdale raised a legal point 
which he thought might offer a way out of the claims difficulty. 
Granville replied to this because it was not of the same type 
as the general discussions which it had seemed to be the "una­
nimous feeling...on both sides of the House,that it would be 
better hot to discuss...in the present state of the negotiations 
on the subject".! Lord Oranmore and B r o W A e  then asked for 
information concerning the British note of 3 February, because 
in*spite of the Lords' agreement to observe reticence the sub­
ject had been so freely debated on the Address in the Commons.2 
Granville refused to answer. Then Malmesbury made'a few re­
marks, chiefly criticising the 'amateur' character of the 
Commissioners, and also objecting to the freedom allowed to the 
Commons after the Lords had kept silence, and with this the 
conversation closed.^3
The same day G. Dixon-asked for further papers in the 
Commons, and Gladstone refused to give them.4 Except for two 
discussions between Disraeli and Gladstone, raised by the former 
in a purely tendentious spirit, as to the exact date of the
arrival of the American case in this country,^ there was no
1. Hans., CCIX.280. 2. Ibid., cols.280-4.
3. Ibid.. cols.285-7. 4. Ibid.. col*294.
5. Ibid.. cols.529,654.
further reference to the matter in either House until 22 February 
when it was agreed that Addresses should be moved for the Ameri- 
can case, which had been presented to the Senate on the l3th*
The case was laid on 26 February as North America No.2 of 1872.2 
On 1 March, after twice being questioned on the subject, 
Gladstone informed the Commons that the American reply to the 
"friendly communication" was on its way.3 On the 14th, in 
answer to a further question, Gladstone denied that it had al- - 
ready been received.^ The next night he was again questioned 
and replied that the Cabinet would consider the matter the
following d a y .  5 At the same time he appealed to Peter Hylgtnds
to postpone his motion on laying of treaties before ratification 
because "it would not be possible for that important and diffi­
cult question to be so fully discussed as it deserves in the 
present state of these important negotiations with America, out 
of which the desire for the discussion had proceeded".^ • The 
postponement was agreed to, without difficulty since the motion 
was not really hostile to the Government, Hylands being a Li­
beral. -  ^ - ' - " ' ' ' ^  - '
- On 18 March Malmesbury asked for the production of the 
American despatch and for a statement of the position of the
1. Hans., CCIX.861(H.L. ),869(1-1.C. ). ; _ :
2. North America No.2(1872) l~C.4761, B.C. (1872), LXIX.173-330.
3. Hans.. CCIX.1220.- 4. Ibid., col.1950.
5. Ibid., OCX.49-50. 6. Ibid. -
negotiations, but Granville refused information.! Gladstone 
was a little less secretive in the Commons and volunteered the 
information that the American despatch "does not come -dp to 
our view" and "it required an answer"* He refused to produce 
papers and pleaded for the forbearance of the House.
.Next day, .however, E. Horsman asked for an assurance that 
"no proposal shall be submitted by the British Government...to 
be binding upon this country, until Parliament had had know­
ledge of the proposal and has had ah opportunity of expressing 
an opinion on it".^ Gladstone refused to answer without con­
sulting the Cabinet,4 and the,next day refused to entertain the 
proposal, although he admitted that "Parliament ought to.be 
• informed of the spirit, aim, and direction of the policy of the 
Government".5 This was sufficiently vague, since the House of 
Gommons knew nothing about the "spirit, aim, and direction" of 
the Government's policy except that they were trying to find 
means to maintain.the Ireaty. That same day, the British 
reply was sent to General Schenck.^ It consisted of a long 
despatch, accompanied by a nineteen-page memorandum, reasser­
ting the British position, but certainly not justifying Horsman's 
fears.that Britain would put forward "new proposals".
O n t h e  22nd, Derby, taking up Gladstone's point, claimed
1. Hans., CCX.105-G. 2. Ibid., cols.127-8.
3. Ibid*. col.249. 4. Ibid.. cols.249-50.
5. Ibid. . col.323-6.'
6. North America No.7 (1872) QC 545] No.4, H.C.(1872), LXIX.: 
659-83.
that although " the details of a negotiation are wisely and 
necessarily left in the hand of the Government who are con­
ducting it, the general principles on which that negotiation 
is or ought to he based, are a fair subject of Parliamentary 
criticism, at the time when alone such criticism can have any 
practical result".^ Granville, in reply, claimed that he did 
not think the Government had been "unduly reticent" and ex­
pressed a desire "to discuss this question in the fullest and 
most complete manner’/^or Nevertheless he again produced the 
stock excuse that it was "not for the public interest" to go 
into "a/discussion of this sort at the present moment".2 
did not quite succeed in preventing debate, for some remarks 
were made as to the manner in which Britain ought to treat the 
American claims, but these observations were brief and re­
strained.^ , '
Thereafter both Houses were silenced by the advent of the 
Easter recess, and when they reassembled it had been decided! 
to submit a Gountercase, an exchange of notes with General 
Schenck having established that Brittain could do so "without 
prejudice" to the position she had taken up.^ When Parliament 
was informed of this, on 12 April, the strain of enforced - 
silence was beginning to tell, and the Lords were not satisfied
1* Hans., OCX.489-90. 2. Ibid.. cols.492-3,
3. Ibid.. cols.495-501. .
4. -Kortli Aiiieriea IJo.3 (1872) [C.5053, H.C.(i872), LXIX.331-6.
with a statement which gave no indication as to what was to he 
done about the indirect claims. Several speakers indicated 
that the Government should state outright that unless these
claims were withdrawn Britain would not proceed with the arbi-
- ■- ■ - ■■ • - 
tration. In the Common.s, Disraeli confined himself to a
request for papers, which Gladstone evaded.%
On 15 April, the Gountercases were presented at Geneva, , 
and next day the British Countercase was laid before both 
Houses, with the correspondence Which had taken place concer­
ning it, as North America Nos.3. 4. and 5 of 1872.3 On the 
18th, Gladstone again refused to answer a question on the pro­
posed actions of the Government, but once again the Upper House 
was more difficult to handle.
On the 22nd, the Duke of Richmond, leader of the Opposition, 
gave notice to ask whether the Government would give an assu­
rance that the arbitration would be suspended unless the indi­
rect claims were withdra?m.4 Then Lord Oranmore moved an 
Address for the correspondence on the Countercase, but Granville 
maintained that North America No.5 contained all that could be 
given. When Richmond's question came up the next e v e n i n g , . 
Granville refused to answer it, using a form af words agreed
1. Hans.. OCX.1134-42.
2. Ibid.. cols.1144-9.
3. H.C.(1872), LXIX.331-638.
4. Hans.. GCX.1619.
5. Ibid.. cols.1619-24.
between himself and Gladstone or perhaps in Cabinet.! The 
chief point of the reply was that the Government could make 
no answer, until the United States reply to the 20 March des­
patch was received. But Gladstone was uneasy about taking 
this ground and had written to Granville the same day in the 
following w o r d s : - "I feel the force of what you said yesterday 
about'.the almost certain necessity of much disclosure after 
the receipt of the U.S. dispatch if it is unsatisfactory.
‘ "Now they have already made more than a half-confidence 
through the newspapers; and query whether if we do nothing
before getting the answer and a great ideal then they may accuse
2
US of a surprise?" ; 3
To safeguard themselves against this charge, Granville 
spoke to General Schenck the next day, and warned him that when 
the American reply was received the Government would be bound 
to make a full statement about the development of the situation, 
and the course they intended to pursue.3
On 29 April Bussell postponed the motion for an Address 
to have the arbitration suspended, of which he had given notice
!• Hans., CCZ.1676-7. Granville to Gladstone (undated in G. and 
D. 29/61) suggested the latter part concerning reliance on 
Parliamentary support, in addition to the words "which we 
agreed last night". Granville to Gladstone (23 Apr.1872,
G. and B. 29/61) transmits the first part, docketed "proposed 
answer to the questions of the Duke of Richmond and Disraeli",
2. Gladstone to Granville, 23 Apr.1872 (G. and D. 29/61) Pte.
- Granville Papers. , 3 ■”
3. Granville to Thornton, No.157, 24 Apr.1872 (P.0.5/1397).
for that day, until 6 May, in order to give time for this 
despatch to arrive.! The next night both Houses were in­
formed that the despctfcchi had arrived but had not yet been
p
communicated. The arrival of the despatôh, however, did not 
bring with it the end of requests for restraint for which the 
Houses had hoped. The despatch had been rendered out of date 
by unofficial negotiations between Schenck and Granville,3 
and this circumstance induced the latter to plead, on 6 May, 
for a further postponement of Hussèll's motion.
But it seemed that the Lords had reached the limit of 
their endurance. Bussell, supported by several other peers, 
agreed to the postponement only on the condition that papers 
should be laid or at least a statement made within a few days, 
and if necessary the Whitsuntide adjournment would then be
postponed in order to give time for discussion.^ On the ap- !
I
pointed day, 13 May, statements were made to both Houses, de- i
scribing the negotiation of the proposed, Supplemental Article, j
which was to cut out.the indirect claims. No details of the j
nature of the article were given, but on the ground that it j
had. just been submitted to the Senate, the Government refused I
to present papers and made another plea for Parliamentary re- |
. 5 ■ '
straint. By these means they obtained a further postponement
1. Han^., CCX.lf27-S. 2 . Ibjb,., cols. 1979(PI.L. ) ,2019 (hC.) J
3* North America No.9 (1872) [C.5GG], Nos.1-3, H.C.(1872), -LXIX.’ 
713-7. '
4. Hans., OCX.267-73. '
5. Ibid., GCXI.632-42(H.L.),654-63(H.C.).,
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of Russell's motion, but only after he had made a very violent 
speech attacking the Government and the United States in the 
most forthright t e r m s . G l a d s t o n e  wrote next day: "Lord
Russell last night offered a spectacle melancholy to those who 
have knoiivn and admired him when he was himself. .1 presume 
you will say a few words to Schenck, to prevent his taking the 
speech as that of 'a reipresentative m a n ' T h i s  was done, 
and also Derby had d o n e  m u c h  to neutralise the impression made 
by Russell's attack in a restrained and statesmanlike speech.3 
In the House of Commons the Government statement passed 
off quietly enough, with a few words from Disraeli on the duties 
of Parliament with which Gladstone was delighted. . His letter 
to Granville concludes with the following words: "Dizzy was
perfect. I understand he was much pleased with my having 
called to inquire after Lady Beaconsfield a few days ago. Per­
haps this helped a little."4
Both Houses adjourned immediately, and only three days 
later, on the 16th, the text of the Supplemental Article was 
published in the Times.^ -Next day, North America No.7 had 
to be hurriedly published in the London Gazette as a result of
1. Hans.. CCZI.642-7.
2. Gladstone to Granville, 14 May 1872 (G. and D. 29/61; Pte, 
Granville Papers).
3. Hans.. GGXI.647-8.
4. Gladstone to Granville, 14 May 1872 (G. and D. 29/61) Pte. 
Granville Papers).
5. -16 May, 5a. '
publication in America/ This Blue Book contained the corres­
pondence on the indirect claims arising from the "friendly 
communication" which had just been refused to the Commons.
In this case, the Government could not claim that they had 
been taken by surprise, by publication in the United States. 
Thornton had telegraphed on the 14th that Mr. Fish "asked me 
this evening whether there would be any objection to the pub­
lication of the four notes on the indirect claims between you 
and the American Minister. I said 1 thought not. But he 
begged me to ask you as he does not wish to do anything which 
might embarrass Her Majesty's Government."^ Granville replied 
the same day: "We have thought it better not to present the
papers, but we do not wish to restrict the liberty of action 
of the United States in this particular and only ask, that they 
should let us know what they d o . I t  is clear that the Bri­
tish Government withheld the papers for motives of their o m ,  
and there is no indication in the records or private papers 
of what these motives were.
The leakage of the documents comprising North America No.7 
was not nearly so Important as the publication of the Supple­
mental Article, however. The exchange of despatches following 
the "frÈèndly communication" had already been superseded by the
1. Thornton to Granville, No.295, 14 May 1872 (F.O.5/1399).
2. Recorded in Thornton to Granville, No.299, 14 May 1872 (ibid.).
negotiation of the Article, and it was the publication of the 
Article and the reports of the state of the negotiation while 
it was under consideration by the Senate which were the chief 
targets for criticism after the recess.
When the Upper House reassembled on 3l May, the negotigc- 
tions were at a critical stage, since the United States Senate 
had agreed to one form of words for the Article and the Ameri­
can Government were unwilling to consider any amendment, while
the British Government refused to accept the Article as it 
1
stood. : By this time, the House of Lords were unwilling to 
listen to pleas for restraint. : Grey, Westbury, and Cairns^ 
all insisted that the House should be given information and 
permitted to debate. Cairns said: "I am one of those who
recognise a considerable amount of the advantage of our con­
stitutional principle that the Sovereign, through her Ministers, 
is entitled to negotiate and conclude treaties with Foreign 
Powers; but I must say that Her Majesty's Government are 
straining that principle on the present occasion. to a degree 
to which 1 think it never was strained before, and which, I 
venture to say, if carried much further, will go far to subvert 
the principle altogether."3 It was in these circumstances 
that Earl Russell's motion, so often postponed, was finally
1. North America No.9 (1872) [C.56G], Nos.8-15,21-47, H.C.(1872), 
LXIX.721-31,733-47.
2. The first two were Liberal peers.
3. Hans.. CCXI.903.
announced for 4 June.
This was the end of Parliamentary reticence. Yet Lord
Russell's motion when it came on could not have any effect on 
immediate Government policy. The form of the motion was a 
'prayer' "that all proceedings on behalf of Her Majesty before 
the Arbitrators appointed to meet at Geneva pursuant to the 
Treaty of Washington be suspended until the claims included in 
the case submitted on behalf of the United States, and under­
stood on the part of Her Majesty not to be within the province 
of the Arbitrators, have been withdrawn". The long debate 
hinged almost entirely on the fact that throughout the corres­
pondence on the Supplemental Article which had been.published 
in the press Mr. Fish had repeatedly stated that America could 
not consent to withdraw the indirect claims. The Lords were 
therefore, unable to see how the Supplemental Article, however 
worded, could achieve the British purpose*
The debate was quite out of touch with the reality of the 
situation, however, because the Lords did not know that the 
negotiations had reached a stage where it was almost certain 
that the Article could not be agreed to. The discussions 
between the two Governments for more than a week had been 
concerned with the possibility of agreeing to an adjournment
1. Hans.,00X1.1107.
2. Since 28 May;- North America No.9 (1372) [0,5661, No.32,
H.C.(1872), LXIX.739.
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of the arbitration in order to give time to devise some other 
means of avoiding a decision on the indirect claims.
% e n  the Lords' debate was resumed after adjournment, on 
6 June, these facts did not deter Granville from effectively 
silencing the House by continuing to conceal the information 
that there was little or no hope of a successful conclusion to
' i
the negotiation while reading a despatch from General Schenck 
stating definitely that the indirect claims were excluded by 
the Supplemental Article.^ Derb;^ and Russell^ expressed their
satisfaction with the statement, and the motion was promptly 
withdrawn. .
By this means the Government concluded the first real 
attempt at interference by the Lords which had taken place that 
session. It is clear from a letter of Gladstone to Granville 
that the motion had caused the Government some, embarrassment. 
Gladstone wrote from the Commons on 4 June: "Speaking roughly,
the idea here is that, though we could probably array,,: a 
majority of this House in support of a defensive motion on the 
Treaty of Washington, it is very doubtful whether a balance of 
advantage would arise. A large minority in this House would
be arrayed against us, with a majority perhaps of independent 
and effective speakers. The Opposition Bench, which has
1. North America No.9 (1S72) [C. 5G61, No.39, H.C.(1872) , LXIX. 
39-40.
2. Hans., CCXI.1262-4. 3. Ibid.. cols.1264-5.
4. Ibid.. col.1266.
hitherto., been nearly silent, would be almost compelled to 
support their friends in the^Lords. The mere preponderance 
of numbers there would be, but I doubt whether it would tell 
so much as the steady abstinence of the entire House of Commons 
and its implied approval in a general way of the objects and 
policy, if not of all the precise steps, of the Government.
I send this as expressing the impression of a few at the mo­
ment. »»!
There had in fact been several exchanges in the Commons 
since that House had reassembled on 27 May. ■ Usually these 
had taken the shape of demands for information, but on 3 June 
Viscount Bury gave notice of a motion on the lihes of that 
made by Earl Bussell.% Since Gladstone refused to give a day 
for this motion, the debate did not take place. Dis/aeli had 
taken part in these exchanges from time to time, but had con­
fined himself to brief statements and questions, doing nothing 
which might embarrass the Government. It appears from the 
debates that the members Gladstone had in mind when he wrote 
his note to Granville were Bouverie, Horsman, Osborne, Bury, 
and Wyndham. All but the last of these were Liberals, although 
Horsman and Bouverie were opposed.to Gladstone personally and 
Bury actually became a Conservative in 1875. They were not
1. Gladstone to Granville, 4 June 1872 a<îAi ; Pk .
2. Hans.. CCXI.1048.
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much to he feared in the House so long as they were not suppor­
ted by the official Opposition and Gladstone succeeded on the 
whole in keeping them fairly quiet. '
In a very few days, Parliament discovered the device by 
which glty had been silenced. On 11 June, Granville's des­
patch suggesting an eight months' adjournment of the arbitra- 
1
tion, was published in the Daily'News. apparently as a result 
of having been telegraphed en clair from the American Legation. 
Fish's telegram in reply refusing this proposal was also pub-
o
lished. Granville made a statement in the House of Lords 
that night, which added little fo the facts to be obtained 
from the newspapers. He was followed by Cairns, whose violent 
attack was deprecated by the Lord Chancellor and HAmherley, who 
accused Cairns of being pro-American.3
In the Commons Gladstone's statement was even less satis­
factory. He explained that there was no.hope of concluding 
the Supplemental Article before the Arbitrators were due-to 
meet on the l5th, and that negotiations were in progress to 
obtain a postponement of the meeting. He refused to say what 
steps would be taken if the negotiations for postponement 
failed.^ The absence Of any reference to the Daily News 
report produced a feeling of "mu.te astonishment" in Bennal Osborne,
1. North America No.9 (1872) [C.5Gd1 , Nos.32 and 64, H.C.(1872), 
., LXIX.739,753.
2. Ibid., No.68 incl. (p.755).
3. Hans., CCXI.1562-82." 4. Ibid.. cols.1589-901
¥but did not prevent hirn attacking ”this humiliating despatch" 
in the strongest terms,^ Several other members criticised the 
Government's action but once more the Opposition Bench remained
ailent.2
Thereafter, the Houses received very little information, 
and asked for it only occasionally. The Government were left 
free to get out of the difficulty as best they might. On 15 
June, both parties proceeded.to the arbitration, where the 
British agent asked for the postponement.* This resulted in 
a delay of four days, while the American agent awaited instruc­
tions. During this time a 'gentlemen's agreement’ was reached 
between Adams and Palmer who together drafted the Declaration 
made by the Arbitrators, that the indirect claims did not con­
stitute a "good foundation for an award of compensation or 
computation of damages between nations, and should upon such 
principles be wholly excluded from the consideration df the 
Tribunal in making its a w a r d " T h i s  declaration was made on 
19 June and subsequently accepted by both Governments.5
The result was announced to the Houses on the 27th and 
was greeted with almost complete silence. As Granville wrote: 
"II n'y a rien qui réussit comme le s u c c è s . further
1. Hans., CCXI.1590-2. 2. Ibid.. cols.1594-1614.
3. North America Ho.10 (1872) [G.570], Nos.1-6. H.G.(1872),
 ^ LXIX.785-8. ' :  ^ /-
4. Ibid.. Ho.8 incl. (pp.768-9).
5. ibid.. Nos. 9 and 10 incl. (pp.770-1).
6. Granville to Gladstone, 28 June 1872 * A.ta.Ms
%reference to the matter was made that session, and during the 
recess the Tribunal concluded its work and awarded damages 
against Great Britain. By the time Parliament met in February 
1873, the question was closed,’and received little comment. 
Granville wrote: "Parliament is hardly as sore as might be
expeeted.at the result of the two awards. I do not think we 
shall hear much more in the Houses about the question, of which 
people are rather tired."
The history of these three issues - the Black Sea, Central 
Asian, and American questions — amply illustrates how the action 
of Parliament was hampered and the possibility of influence 
greatly reduced by the practice of withholding a Blue Book 
until a negotiation was concluded. It also shows how the 
effect of this principle was increased by two oUther factors.
Ihe first of these was the unwillingness of Parliament, acting 
from a consideration of its own interests and dignity, to debate 
before papers had been laid. The second was the convention 
that, in any case, debate ought not to take place while a nego­
tiation was still in progress since this would, in a sense, 
render Parliament a party to the negotiation.
Through fairly strict adherence to these conventions, Par­
liament was deprived of any possibility of affecting the course
1. Granville to Thornton, 8 Feb.1873 (P.0.362/1; Pte. Granville 
. Papers).
¥of both the Black Sea and the Central Asian negotiations*
The same may.be said of the Treaty of Washington up to the 
beginning of 1872. Gladstone indeed on one occasion carried 
the convention of not debating during a negotiation to extreme 
lengths. On 8 June, 1869, he appealed to Sir Henry BulT/er to 
withdraw a motion to call attention to the contents of the 
last Blue Book. The ground on which he claimed that with­
drawal was that, although the rejection of the Clarendon- 
Johnson treaty by the American Senate "had the aspect of the 
cessation of the subject...Her Majesty's Ministers had no reason 
to believe that the Jnited States Government regarded the ques­
tion as having been definitely dropped". Therefore, he said, 
the case must be considered as ’’still substantially pending
between the two Governments".* In #act no negotiations were
/ - ;
in progress and the question was not revived until October of 
that year when, it.may be noted. Parliament was not in session.
The position of the^negotiation concerning the indirect 
claims, and its bearing on the British attitude to the Geneva 
Tribunal in 1872 was sometehat different. Publication of 
authentic documents in the press, and announcements to Parlia­
ment, greatly reduced the significance-of thS Blue Books. The 
nature of the negotiations, too, contributed to this result, 
because of the speed with which their direction changed. The
1. Hans.,GXGYII.1425-7.
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absence of Parliamentary influence on these negotiations is 
therefore not attributable to the time when Blue Books were 
laid, but to other factors. The first of these was the rapid 
changes in direction which have been mentioned. From time to 
time these changes led Parliament to attempt debate from a false 
assessment of the diplomatic position.
The second and perhaps more important factor was the rule 
of silence during negotiations, which was almost completely 
maintained throughout the Parliamentary session of 1372.
Twelve Blue Books on the American negotiations were laid during 
that time, and even though the information they contained was 
not new to the House, it was usually accepted that the presen­
tation of papers was in some sense an invitation to comment.
Few debates took place, however, because the House took a more 
realistic view of the situation, and allowed themselves-to be 
bound by the fact that the negotiations continued, that the 
papers marked no logical stage or stopping point in the dip­
lomatic transactions. :
Gladstone implied that the silence of the House of Commons 
indicated agreement with the policy of the Government. This 
view seems to be borne out by Disraeli's statement in favour 
of continued reticence on 20 June, 1872.^ :
The Blue Books on the Franco-Prussian war had even less
1. Hans., SGXI,l9o6.
connection with the possible amount of Parliamentary influence, 
than those on the indirect claims. This was perhaps an inevi­
table result of the speed at which events moved, but the Blue> 
Book policy o f ’the Government may have contributed to it. The 
first papers dealt with the attempts to prevent war and the 
assurances,of the belligerents that they would respect the neu­
trality of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, taking the course 
of the negotiations up to 25 July, 1870, the date of the pub-
i
lication of the Benedetti Treaty. Nominally, the Blue Book 
was laid on 22 July,- but it contained despatches received on 
the 25th and it is clear from the’ debates that it was not in 
fact circulated until late in the evening on that day, at the 
earliest. This is a factor always to be borne in mind when 
dealing with Blue Books. Very rarely were they in the hands 
of members on the day on which they were nominally laid.^
. In this particular case, it may be conjectured that the 
Blue Book was deliberately delayed. This may not have been 
the case, and thebe is no evidence either way, but it is sig­
nificant that it was on 22 July that Gladstone and Granville 
were secretly informed of the existence of the Benedetti Treaty, 
and that the first Blue Book was practically ignored in the 
storm which followed the Treaty’s publication. Gladstone's
1. Franco-Prussian W a r  Ho.l [C.167] ,: H.C.(1S70), LXZ.17-100.
2.‘ See Appendix II for a list of dates of circulation.
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excuse in the House was that "it was obviously necessary in 
conformity with usage and obvious motives of policy, that we 
should give opportunities of communication with our chief 
representatives abroad" but there is no trace of such commu­
nication in the Foreign Office records, except with Lord Lyons, 
the Ambassador at Paris.
In these circumstances, therefore, there was no major 
debate in the Commons, after the Blue Book had been laid, on 
the efforts made by the British Government to prevent war.
On 28 July, the subject received some consideration in a short 
debate in the Lords, but events were moving so rapidly that 
this was no longer an issue of any real importance.
The second Blue Book,laid on 29 July, contained the des­
patches on the Benedetti Treaty,^ but this did not directly 
concern the British Government and would not in any case have 
been taken into consideration by Parliament in the same way as 
an ordinary transaction.
The third Blue Book, of which the most important contents
were the papers on the negotiation of the new Belgian Treaty,
 ^ 2
was laid on 10 August, the day of the prorogation of Parlia­
ment, so there was no time to discuss its contents.
Only after the recess were papers laid which were subse-
1. Franco-Prussian War No.2 (1870) rc.lGSl. H,C.(l870), LXX. 
101— 14.
2. Branco-Prussian War No.3 (1870) [Ç.210], H.C.(l870), LXX. 
115-220.
quently taken into consideration by Parliament in a manner 
likely to influence future policy* These were the papers 
concerning the preservation of neutrality and the possibility 
of mediation, which had passed during the recess.^ The 
Belgian Treaty was laid at the same time,^ but this was no 
longer a live issue, its provisions having been published 
before the recess. The last Blue Book, describing British 
efforts to obtain a reduction of the indemnity imposed on 
France by Germany,^ passed without comment.
These were the Blue Books, and according to the usual 
conventions, the first three were laid in a manner which would 
have prevented Parliamentary comment. The Franco-Prussian 
war was an exceptional case, however, and in the six weeks ; 
preceding the recess in 1870 Parliament was far from silent.
The Hohenzollern candidature was reported in England on 
5 July, 1870. The next day Granville wrote a despatch to 
Loftus, outlining British policy in view of the agitation in 
France. This policy was to.remonstrate against precipitate 
action by France and to apply pressure without dictation to 
Prussia and Spain in an attempt to obtain the withdrawal of 
the candidature. On the 11th Granville outlined this policy
1. Franco-German War Ho.l (l87l) 10.2441, B.C.( 1 8 71),LXZI.1-284
2. 10.2401, E.G.(1871), LXX.75-80. --
3. Franc0- German War Ho.3 (1871) CC.2661 , E.G.(1871), LXXI,321-8.
4. Franc.o^Prussian War No. 1 ( 1870) [0.167], No.5, E.C.(l870).
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in answer to a question of Malmesbury, and in the Commons 
Gladstone answered the House that the "Government have exer­
cised, and will exercise, all the legitimate and friendly •
influence they may be supposed to possess" in order to pre- .
1
vent war. Two days later, the withdrawal of the Eohenzollern 
candidature was obtained,^ but the same evening Loftus tele­
graphed a report of his conversation with Bismarck, which in- 
dicated that Prussia was not^with the French attitude.'^ Later 
the same evening a telegram from Lyons declared that France was 
not prepared to accept the withdrawal as a final settlement.^ 
The - Government expected questions in Parliament on the 
evening of the l4th, and Gladstone considered using the oppor­
tunity to make another effort to influence France. . Ee sugges­
ted that Granville might telegraph to Lyons "to signify that 
we think it probable questions may be put in Parliament today; 
that having been called in by France itself we cannot affect 
to be wholly outside the matter: and that it will be impossible
for us to conceal the opinion that the cause of quarrel having
1. Hans., CCIII.3^4yW:
2. Gladstone was at this time considering a trip to Scotland 
on family business, but Granville dissuaded him, saying: 
"The Spanish question however is up to this time still un­
settled, the P.M. and the F.O. Secretary are responsible to 
the Cabinet for the conduct of pressing and important de­
tails. Questions may be asked in the Commons on very deli­
cate matters" (Granville to Gladstone, 13 July 1870, B.M. 
Add. MS 44167, fos.84-6; Pte. Gladstone Papers).
3. The despatch was printed as No.53 of the Blue Book. Franco- 
Prussian War No.l (1870). pp.54-5.
4. Printed as No.41 of the Blue Book, ibid.. pp.48-9.
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been removed France ought to be satisfied".^ This suggestion 
was not adopted and before the Commons met, the news of the 
effect of the Ems telegram in France^ caused Gladstone to aban­
don the form of words he had previously suggested for the Par­
liamentary answer. He confined himself to the statement that 
"the communications between France and Prussia have not been 
brought actually to a close, and I need scarcely add that we 
shall continue to do all that depends upon us for the removal , 
of difficulties and the continuance of peace".*
Up to this point both Houses were pretty well informed, , 
through the press, of the course of events as between France 
and Prussia. They did not know with equal certainty what 
steps had been taken by the British Government. On the 15th, 
however, their information was brought up to date in this di­
rection also, when Gladstone indicated, although he did not 
directly state, that Britain had appealed to .the Twenty-third 
Protocol of the Paris Conference.^
Parliament adjourned for the weekend, and on Monday,. 18 
July, Bussell asked for a general statement as to what British
1. Gladstone to Granville, 14 July 1370 C ^ y ^
2. Franco-^russian War No.l (1870). no.60, pp.57-8.
3. Hans.. CCIII.255.
4. Ibid. . col.347; Franco-Prussian War No.l (1870). No.57, p.57. 
The Protocol stated: "Les Plénipotentiaires n ’hésitent pas à 
exprimer, au nom de leurs Gouvernements, le voeu que les Etats 
entre lesquels s ’élèverait un dissentiment sérieux, avant d ’eii 
appeler aux armes, eussent recours en tant que les circon­
stances l'admettraient, aux bons offices d ’une Puissance amie" 
(Treaty of Paris [20721, p.107, H.C.(1856), LXI.145).
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policy haû been, but Granville asked him to wait until papers 
had been laid. On the 2ist Gladstone repeated this request 
to the Commons, but in answer to further questions informed the 
House that Britain had received assurances from the belligerents 
that they would respect the neutrality of Belgium, Holland, and 
luxembourg.
The delayed publication of the first Blue Book, and the 
publication of the Benedetti Treaty, drew a short speech from 
Disraeli on the 25th, but Gladstone again asked for postponement 
of debate until the papers were laid.'' It seems that they were 
actually circulated the same evening, but interest was by then 
centred on the developments which would arise from the Benedetti 
Ireaty. Explanations from France and Prussia arrived during 
the next four days and were immediately communicated to both 
Houses.^
The effect of the Benedetti Treaty on opinion in.Parliament
was two-fold. In the first place, it aroused great anxiety
about the maintenance of Belgian neutrality. . This is indicated 
*
by members eagerness for information about the Treaty. Further 
evidence comes from a note written by Otway, the Parliamentary
1. Hans., c o i n . 379-82. .
2. Ibid.. cols.637— 40,644-6. These assurances had been completed 
the previous day. (Franco-Prussian War No.l (1870). Nos.64.84.
: » 94,104,105). .  ^ '
3. Ëans., CCIII.879-85. . . .
FrancQ-Prussian War No.2 (1870). Nos.2-8. H.C.: Hans. CCIII.
955,988-9; H.L.: ibid., cols.924-6,1143-56.
for
Ünder-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Granville on the 26th.' 
He wrote: "The Project of Treaty was the universal topic of
conversation in our House last night and many doubts expressed 
as to the possibility of our preserving neutrality in the event 
of the document proving to be what the Times declares it."^
In the House of Lords, both Russell and Malmesbury implied by 
their speeches on the 23th that Britain should take steps to 
maintain the neutrality of Belgium.^
By that time, the Cabinet and the Foreign Office were 
themselves considering ways and means. The steps to be taken 
had evidently been discussed on or before the 29th, since a 
note from Granville to Gladstone on that date says: "I had
begun a’ note desiring Hammond to put down his views in writing ' 
when I got the enclosed, with which I do not a g r e e . T h e  
enclosure was a memorandum suggesting that Britain should con­
fine herself to expressing satisfaction with the declarations 
of the belligerents respecting Belgian neutrality, and contai­
ning Hammond's opinion that any new treaty would be harmful 
rather than otherwise.^
1. Otway to Granville, 26 July 1870 (G. and D. 29/107) Pte. 
Granville Papers. This does not refer to debate but to 
private conversation in the House.
2 . Hans.. CCIII.1057-64.
3. Granville to Gladstone, 29 July 1370 (G. and D. 29/104; Pte. 
Granville Papers).
4. Hammond Memo. (Tbid.; _ Pte. Granville Papers).
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On the 30th, at a Cabinet, it was decided to propose a new 
treaty, whereby Britain would join with either power if the 
other violated the neutrality (ff Belgium, and this decision 
was immediately embodied in despatches to Berlin and Paris.^
Next evening, there was a long and important debate in the 
House of Commons, initiated by Disraeli.^ He maintained that 
an expression of opinion by the House would be of great value 
as a support to the Ministry in whatever steps they were taking. 
The character of his speech did not conduce to this object, be­
cause he raised the question of the state of British armaments 
with the result that the debate became a party wrangle on the 
state of the defences.* Except for a few words from Osborne, 
who deplored the fact that the debate was degenerating into one 
on the Navy Estimates,^ it was not until Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer 
spoke that the diplomatic aspects of the question were again 
mentioned. ' Thereafter, Graves, Fawcett, and Beaumont agreed 
with Bulwer that Britain must take some definite action to 
safeguard Belgian neutrality, while O'Brien, Gilpin, and Guest 
took the opposite view.
Gladstone refused to say more than that the Government 
"had taken the steps which, in their judgement, were best cal­
culated to secure the establishment of confidence and security".^
1. Franco-Prussian War No.3 . No.63, p.175.
2. Hans.. CCIII.1286-1300. 3. Ibid.. cols.1301-54.
4. Ibid., col.1321. 5. Ibid.. col.1361.
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A week later he explained to the House that the reason for his 
reticence was that he thought he might inadvertently give 
utterance to words that"bight be held to import obligations 
almost unlimited and almost irrespectively of circumstances".^ 
The only result of the debate seems to have been to bring home 
to Gladstone the necessity of making an anno^pement to the 
House as soon as possible.%
This debate was important, because it brought out, in a 
general way, the views of the House on the three most important 
questions of the moment: Belgian neutrality, the localisation
of the war, and British armaments. The House had no real 
information as to the intentions of the Government on any of 
these points. On the other hand, there is no indication that 
the Ministry paid any attention to the opinions expressed on 
the first two in the course of debate on 1 August. The last 
point was in a different category.
To obtain increased armaments it was necessary to have the 
agreement of the House of Commons, and the second result of the
1. Hans.. CCIII.1705.
2, Gladstone to Granville, 2 Aug.1870: "There is an intense 
desire^in the House that we should say or they should know 
something about Belgium. We are sure to be pressed again 
unless we speak and every time we are pressed the demand for
confidence will seem more exacting and supercilious..,. I am 
very anxious to keep things straight in the House of Commons 
versus Osbornes and Bulwers, both of whom did mischief."
Benedetti '-^reaty was that this agreement was immediately forth­
coming. The Chief Whip had reported to Gladstone on 29 July 
that feeling in the Commons was "much altered. Those who 
were strongly opposed to any measures are now disposed to con­
fide in the Government with respect to them - those who before 
would have confided in the Government and been silent are now 
speaking decidedly for measures to augment our force in one 
shape or another".^ This statement was borne out in the course 
of debate on 1 August.
Throughout the first’week of August, the Government refused 
to give information as to their actions concerning Belgium.%
The policy which was pursued was influenced to some extent by 
Parliamentary considerations**' It was clear to the Government 
that Parliamentary feeling was in favour of some action being 
taken, but the details of the new treaty were worked out enti­
rely on ministerial initiative. On 8 August, before the Treaty 
had been signed, its provisions were- communicated to both 
Houses, but Richmond and Disraeli both replied that discussion 
was impossible on the basis of a verbal communication.^
1. Gladstone to Granville, 29 July 1870 (G. and D. 29/104; Pte. 
Granville Papers).
2. Hans., CCIII.1576-7.
3 . Gramont appreciated this (Lyons to Granville, 5 Aug.1870;
P.0.27/1809), but his statement to this effect was omitted 
from No.100 of Franco-Prussian War No.3 . Granville himself 
defended the treaty to Lyons on Parliamentary grounds (Gran­
ville to Lyons, 4 Aug.1870; P.0.362/4, Pte. Granville Papers).
4. H.L.: Hans.. CCIII.1B71-6; B.C.: ibid.. cols.1699-1706.
•On the 10th the Treaty was debated in both Houses, and,
contrary to Granville's expectation, generally well received. .
This perhaps would not have been the case if the Houses had
known that the statement that Russia and Austria favoured the
#
Treaty was fallacious* Nor did Parliament have any informa­
tion concerning the plans for "combined neutrality" which were 
already afoot when it was prorogued on 10 August.
Osborne had declared during the first Belgian debate: "I
can easily understand. Sir, that it is for the interest of the 
Cabinet to take away that 'bauble' now lying before you and 
get rid of Parliament as fast as they can."^ There-is cer­
tainly an air of anticipatory relief about Granville's note to 
Lyons of 6 August: "We shall have to make a statement on Foreign
Affairs on Monday — I trust the last, and on Wednesday Parlia­
ment will be prorogued. On Thursday the seat of Government 
will be moved by Gladstone and me to Walmer...
After the recess a Blue Book was laid which described the 
agreement arrived at by the neutral states, and the discussions 
which had taken place from time to time as to the possibility 
of mediating between the two belligerents.* The speeches made 
on the subject during the debate on the Address were not of any 
great importance, perhaps because members knew of a notice of
1. Hans.. CCIII.1323. V
2. Granville to Lyons, G Aug.1870 (F.0.362/4; Pte. Granville
Papers)• . :
3. Fr a n c o - m  War No * 1 ( 1871 ).
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motion which had been given for 17 February, 1871. On that 
day Auberon Herbert attempted directly to influence govern­
mental action by moving that "it is the duty of Her Majesty's 
Government to act in concert with other neutral powers, to 
obtain moderate terms of peace". His speech was based directly 
on the information given in the latest Blue Book. After a 
long debate, in which the unusually large number of thirteen 
members took part, Gladstone obtained the withdrawal of the 
motion on the ground that otherwise its defeat would wrongly 
indicate hostility to France.< The defeat of the motion was
quite inevitable since the speakers in the debate were almost 
all Liberals and the Opposition front bench took no part in 
the proceèdings. ' ~
This is a significant point. Although the Blue Book 
policy of the Gladstone Government seems to have been to give 
full information, yet they rarely gave it in time to permit 
Parliamentary influence. In the few cases where information 
was given in time, specifically in the case of the text of the 
Treaty of Washington and the negotiations concerning the Franco- 
Prussian war, debate was useless because the party majority 
could prevent any vote with which the Government did not agree.
1. Hans., CCIV.387-96. - ' 2. Ibid., cols.447-55.
Chapter IV.
PARLIAMENT AND THE EXECUTIVE.
There is no evidence that the Parliament of 1868-1874 ever 
influenced the details of governmental action at any stage. ■ 
There is no case of a motion being carried in either House 
which was subsequently embodied in a diplomatic move by the 
Government, nor is there a case of action being taken as a re­
sult of specific expressions of opinion in debate.
it is well-known that Parliament had a negative influence 
on foreign polipy in certain cases. That is, with regard to 
certain issues, there were some things which a British Parlia­
ment would never tolerate. There is, for instance, the cage 
of Gibraltar. Clarendon wrote to Layard, British Ambassador 
at Madrid, on 15 March, 1870: "I need not tell you that the
cession of Gibraltar is a matter that cannot be trifled with, 
and that our public would be uproariously indignant if it 
thought the Government was going to commit that sort of treason. 
For my own part, I fully sympathize in the Spanish feeling on 
the subject and don't beliei^we should suffer from the lose of 
the place, except as a smuggling depot of which we make scan­
dalous use, but pray explain to Prim that i f  is not a question 
of generosity or magnanimity but of political necessity for
MX
the Government."^ The number of questions which, at any time,
g
were a matter of -political necessity for a Government in this 
way was small. In this period the alienation of any important 
British territory was probably one, and the neutrality of Bel­
gium, perhaps, another. In these matters the Government had 
to be careful not to offend Parliamentary opinion, even if 
they thought it to be merely prejudice.
In the period 1868-1874, Parliamentary influence was not 
confined entirely to the negative approach. There are indi­
cations that debates influenced the general form of some of 
the negotiations. Particularly this was the case with various 
aspects of the Franco-Prussian war. ' The Government seems to 
have been responding to Parliamentary pressure, although not 
actually acting on suggestions made in Parliament, in taking 
steps to safeguard the neutrality of Belgium, in forming the 
neutral association, in offering mediation, and in attempting 
to obtain moderate terms of peace. Each of these developments 
had been previously advocated in debate in a general way, and 
received suppoft particularly from Liberal members.
It is only in connection with Belgian neutrality that, 
evidence existe that the Government was aware of"the necessity 
of responding to Parliamentary and public pressure. Lyons was 
opposed to the formation of a new treaty, and Granville in his
1. Clareûdon to Layard, 15 Mar.1870 (F.0.361/1; Pte. Clarendon 
Papers).
private letters defended the Government's action eiitirely on the 
ground of Parliamentary and public opinion.^l/j;::Glads\one,v too, 
thought some positive step necessary because "a declaration of our 
displeasure against any offender" was not likely to "really sa­
tisfy Europe, or even this country after the. first few days".^
The constitutional convention with regard to foreign policy 
placed the conduct of the details of negotiation entirely with 
the Government, but occasionally Parliament interfered in minor 
diplomatic questions. Lord Lyons was violently attacked in Par­
liament, particularly by Sir Robert Peel, on account of his action 
in leaving Paris during the siege and basing the Embassy with 
the provisional government, at Tours.* Again, in connection 
with Gramont's statement that the powers of Europe recognised 
the justice of the French cause, Granville had cause for irri­
tation at Parliamentary interference. Gramont made the state­
ment on 11 July in the Corps Législatif,^ and although it was ' 
immediately contradicted by Granville,^ Gramont repeated it on 
the l5th in conversation with Lord Lyons.® Next day, Lyons 
wrote to Granville expressing the hope that the matter might be 
allowed to drop, for the sake of future British relations with
1. Granville to Lyons, 1 and 4 Aug.1870 (F.O.362/4; Pte. Gran- 
ville Papers). -
2. Gladstone to Granville, 3 Aug.1870 (G. & D. 29/58: Pte.
' Granville Papers).
3. Hans.., CCIV.398-9,1296-1326, and Franco— German War No.2(l87l)
[C.263], B.C.(1871), LXXI.305-20.     ^
^ m c ^ m s s l g n j ^r. No. 1 ( 1870) [G.16%7, No.29 incl., E.G. 
IlBTO), LXX.42. '
5. Ibid., No.61 incl.3, p.60. 6. Ibid., No.63, p.62.
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France. Granville replied: "% am afÉâid others will not let 
me drop the wrangle with Gramont. Lord Russell will allude 
to it tomorrow in asking me what are the causes of the war."^
In the event Granville evaded the issue as well as he could.*
In the more general sphere of British relations with 
other powers, too, expressions of opinion in debate could some­
times cause embarrassment. Particularly this was the case in 
the course of the negotiations with the United States,^ and 
the Government were careful to ensure that the effect of violent 
speeches was counteracted through the diplomatic channels.*
 ^ On the other hand, Parliament had its uses'. The Govern­
ment could use Parliamentary opportunities to publish its ac­
tions or opinions to the world, either through debate or in 
Blue Book form. During the negotiation concerning the indirect 
claims, Hammond at one time suggested such a step if the American 
answer was unsatisfactory.& But this aspect of the relations 
between Government and Parliament is perhaps more frequently 
illustrated in the opposite way - that publication to Parliament, 
however desirable in itself, was impossible because it meant
lé Newton, Life, of Lord Ivons, 1.299/ ^v
2. Granville to Lyons, 17 July 1870 (f .0.362/4; Pte. Granville 
Papers ).
3. Hans., CCIII.379— 82. 4# Supra, p*W.
5. Granville to Thornton, 13 May 1872 (F.O.5/1399):
Gladstone to Granville, 14 May 1872 (G. and D. 29/61; Pte. 
Gtadville Papers).
6. Hammond memo., 2 Mar.1672 (G. and D, 29/105: Pte. Granville
Papers.). -^-------
in '
publication to a wider audience. As Gladstone said with re­
ference to Belgian neutrality: "The reason we restrained our
own wish and the wish of the House last Monday [the 1 August 
debate! by not making any general declaration on our part as 
regards Belgium, was that we thought much danger might arise 
from such a declaration, that we might inadvertently give 
utterance to words that might be held to import obligations
' ■ ■ ■ - ' ■ ■ ... - ' - 4
almost unlimited and almost irrespectively of circumstances."
Parliament could also be used to demonstrate the feeling 
of the 'nation*. Again the American question provides the 
best example. Granville was as careful to make sure that a 
favourable debate was immediately reported, as tee was to see ■ 
that the effect of an unfavourable one was counteracted.
Apart from one occasion, at the outbreak of the Franco- 
PruBBian war, which has been mentioned,* there are no other 
illustrations of the use of Parliament as a diplomatic excuse 
or means of coercion in connection with ma^or issues in this
period. The 'Tornado* case, however, illustrates what could
be done in this way, if one was dealing with a small and weak
power such as Spain.
This case was covered by the foreign secretaryships of 
both Stanley and Clarendon, and it is interesting to. observe
1. Hans., c m . 1705; cf. supra, p.*®7<
2. Supra. p.l&.
3. Supra. pp-Jox-i.
that their methods vrere rather different. Stanley's practice 
when laying a Blue Book was either to wait until he had achie­
ved some success, and conclude the papers with the despatch 
recording it;^ or to conclude them with a'strong* despatch, 
demanding action, and lay the papers without giving Spain time
p
to reply. Clarendon’s method was more subtle. He regularly 
telegraphed that there was shortly to be a debate or a Blue 
Book on the 'Tornado* question, with such phrases as "Her Ma- . 
jesty's Government will be at a loss to explain the silence 
observed by the Spanish Government",* or "I should be very glad 
to learn before that time that the Spanish Government was dis­
posed to act liberally towards the crew".^
•This is an illustration of the realistic attitude of the  ^
Government to its Parliamentary obligations. The impression 
which emerges from private papers and from the debates is that 
the Government accepted the fact of Parliamentary interference 
from time to time, and was confident of its ability to 'manage * 
Parliament. . This object was achieved in various ways; partly 
through the working of the party machine, and partly through 
the influence of personality.
In a more general sphere, the Government kept control of
1. Ternado Pt.VIII (1866-67) [58741, H.C.(1867), LXXV.551-84.
2. Tornado Pts. I and II [3772] and [3801], ibid., pp.161-412,
3. Clarendon to Crampton, Tel., 8 May 1869 (P.0.72/1299)•
4. Clarendon to Crampton, Tel., 2 Apr.1869 (P.Q.72/1299).
Parliament by three different methods. The first was, ob­
viously, to avoid giving offence to the House in matters such 
as premature publication. Then, occasionally the Government 
would"defer to the Houses, associating them with its actions 
and claiming their support. This was Gladstone’s reply to 
Osborne’s attempt to persuade the House of Commons to exercise 
its right of refusing supply. He said: "Although...the House
of Commons is the body which really has the exclusive power of 
giving ultimate effect to this treaty [of Washington],...yet 
it must be borne in mind that in the present case, we have 
proceeded on the full and perfect knowledge that this question 
of arbitration was not a new question... we assumed, and had a 
right to assume, that we were already in virtual possession of 
the judgement of Parliament." This may also be considered 
as an example of Gladstone’s mastery of the art of confusing 
the House by the style of his statements/ and another is pro­
vided by the meaningless statement that the House must be in­
formed of the "spirit, aim, and direction" of the Government’s 
policy, which has already been mentioned.% This device of - 
deferring to Parliament could also be used to prevent discussion
while a negotiation was in progress, as in the case of the
statement, made during the American negotiations, that the 
Government "have no doubt of the support which they will receive
1. Hans.. CCIX.117. 2. Supra, p.
(îî
from Parliament"*^ Granville from time to time employed the 
same tactics in the Lords.
Gladstone occasionally went further and referred to con­
stitutional principles, of greater or less obscurity, in his 
management of the House of Commons. The two most striking 
instances of this are to some extent contradictory. On one 
occasion he said that "this House is the only judge of the 
degree in which...it shall maintain reserve and rely upon the 
Executive, or demand information and claim to itself an imme­
diate share in the conduct of affairs. On these matters the 
House is supreme."^ Two years later &e stated that "whatever 
responsibility rests with Parliament...is between the Members 
of the House of Commons and their constituents. It is for the 
constituencies, and not for us, to establish Parliamentary 
responsibility, if it is to be established at all."*'
For the most part, the House of Commons was not particu­
larly interested in foreign affairs. When the international
scene was quiet, such questions were occasionally referred to
: A -
by some member with a particular interest, but there was little 
enthusiasm for them in the House as a whole. In times of acti­
vity, on the other hand, the House considered its advice of
1. Supra, p. 2. Hans.. CCIII. 1300.
3. Ibid., CCIZ.OO.
4. E.g., E.B. Eastwick who initiated both the debates on Central 
Asia in this period (Hans., CXGVTI.1544-82; CCX7.818-77).
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value and resented neglect. :
The diplomatic upheaval which took place in the middle 
of the administration, involving the three important, inter­
related questions of the Franco“ Prussian war, the Black Sea 
question, and the American negotiations, led the House to give 
some consideration to its position with regard to foreign 
affairs. : h .
The movement was given an impetus by the presence in the 
House of a group of Liberals with definite ideas on the sub­
ject. It does not seem that the group was particularly well \ 
defined, but each could be relied upon to raise the subject 
of ^ Parliamentary control from time to time, and received the 
support of the others.
The line they took was that Parliamentary indifference on 
questions of foreign polipy arose from a feeling of impotence. 
They complained of the "false position in which the House of 
Commons is so apt to find itself placed on questions of foreign 
policy. •. % i l e  the diplomatists are busy we are told that 
discussion would be prejudicial to the public interest; when 
negotiations are at an end we are told that discussion would be 
idle on accomplished facts. Pending negotiations the time is 
too soon; at the close of negotiations it is too late. And 
thus it almost invariably happens that Parliament is compelled
11^
1
to abdicate its highest function..
They maintained that the doctrine of Ministerial respon­
sibility was an illusion, because a vote of eensure after the
event could not remedy a diplomatic situation, to which the
2
country was already bound- Therefore they contended that 
Parliament should have some real measure of control over the 
conduct of diplomacy.
Horsman first attempted to obtain an assurance that Par­
liament would be consulted on. the specific question of action 
on the indirect claims.^ On 12 April, 1872, Sir Wilfred Lawson 
brought forward a motion which, as the seconder, Kyiands, said, 
"called upon the Government to reverse the traditional policy 
of the Foreign Office”.^ The motion arose from the Blue Book 
return of Treaties of Guarantee, made the previous year,^ and 
required the Government to withdraw from all such obligations.
Eext year the question of Parliamentary control was again 
raised on the Address,^ and on 14 February Rylands brought 
forward a motion that treaties should be submitted to Parlia­
ment before ratification.? This is another instance of the
1. Horsman, 6 Feb.1873 (Hans., CGXIV.SS). Similarly, Sir Wil­
fred Lawson, 14 Feb.1873 (ibid., col.480).
2. Sir W, Lawson, 12 Apr.1872 Tibid. , OCX.1168) and 14 Feb.1873 
(ibid., GCXIV.4S0).. Sinclair Aytoun, 4 Mar.1873 (ibid.. 
cols.1310-1)/ '
3. 19,20 Mar.1872 (ibid., OCX.249,324-7}.
4. Ibid., cols.1151-83.
5. Lawson had intended to bring it forward the previous session,, 
but was unable to do so and had withdrawn the notice on 4 Aug. 
(Ibia.: CCVIII.885-6).
S, Ibid., CCXIV.85,155. 7. Ibid.. cola.448-90.
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way in which a debate could be affected by outside influences, 
although in this case they were not the'same as those which 
wrecked Sir Charles Dilké’s motion. The 14 February, 1873, 
was a Friday, and therefore, under the rules of procedure 
adopted in 1872, Supply was first order, private members were 
at liberty.to propose amendments, and the Government were 
bound to ’keep a house*. Keeping a house, however, did not, 
of course,mean keeping more than the statutory forty members 
in attendance, and Rylands spoke to half-empty benches, as was 
usual on a Friday evening. Also, his was the second motion 
on the .paper, and since : the first had gone to a division, the 
motion for Supply had already been carried, and Rylands was 
prevented from taking the sense of the House on his motion.
There was a third factor which reduced his chances of
success, and that was - that the.motion referred specifically
to,the French commercial treaty. Since commercial treaties
were, in any case, in a different category from those of a
purely diplomatic kind, this confused the issue. Rylands
explained that the question "naturally arose during the two
past sessions in connection with the Treaty of Washington",
and had he been able to have brought the subject forward on
14 June, 1872, as he intended, he might have obtained more 
1support. ' 7 '
1. He withdrew the notice at Gladstone’s request (Hans.. CCXI.
1694).
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Since the only result of the motion was a long speech from 
Gladstone, without any sign of enthusiasm on the part of the 
House, it is little wonder that Enfield’s tone was disgruntled 
when, only a week later, Sinclair Aytoun brought foiwfard a 
similar motion and supported it with similar arguments.^ As' 
might be expected, he received no support at all.
Enfield’-s reply was significant, for he expressed the 
opinion that the motion should not have been pressed "after 
the exhaustive reply" given by Gladstone to Hylands’ motion, 
"especially as the feeling expressed on both sides of the House 
on that occasion was decidedly adverse to so great an innovation 
in the Constitution".^
This was the crucial point# The handful of Liberals who 
were intent on the reform of procedure received no support 
from the rest of their own party, and very little from the 
Opposition. Occasionally, when the diplomatic situation was 
at a crisis, or in the heat of an important debate, Disraeli 
would speak, as he did at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian 
war, in favour of greater participation by the House in the 
conduct of foreign policy.^ Again, during the debate on the 
Queen’s Speech in 1873, he went so far as to mention the right 
of Parliament to consider treaties before they were ratified,^
1. Hans., CGXIV.1309-14. 2. Ibid., col.1314.
3. 25 July 1870 (Hans., GIII.*S7S); 1 Aug.1870 (ibid., cols.
1286-7.
4. Ibid.. GCXIY.80.
but he ?/as very far from advocating the revolutionary measures 
which would have been necessary to make Parliamentary control 
a reality.
Gladstone replied to Rylands* motion very largely on the 
grounds that there was no way of setting up machinery to make 
useful Parliamentary criticism possible, but he was on safer 
ground when he relied upon the absence of opposition on foreign 
questions. On 1? February, 1871, when Auberon Herbert, 
another member of the reforming group, attempted to move a 
direction to the Government to take a definite step in connecUm 
with terras of peace for France, the Opposition remained compl- 
etely silent, and were castigated next morning by the Times 
because they had "abdicated altogether their proper functions 
as watchful and persistent critics of the Administration of the 
day".3
Gladstone seems to have been in closer touch with the 
situation, however, when he maintained "that there has never 
been that radical opposition of opinion in the policy of one 
party or another, or in the policy of one Government and ano­
ther, with respect to foreign affairs, which may upon particu­
lar questions, at least, be traceable occasionally with regard 
to home affairs; and although an opinion may be very usefully
1. Hans., CGXIV.469— 79* •
2. Ibid.. GGIV.387-455.
3. Times. 18 Feb.1871, 9a.
expressed in this #ouse with reference to a modification of 
the course of our foreign policy at a particular time, an 
attempt to revolutionize that policy would not, I am sure, 
receive from Parliament any degree of countenance.
This statement is h o m e  out by Disraeli’s description of 
the function of the House during the negotiations concerning 
the indirect claims. On l3May, 1872, he said: "I think there
have been two duties for Parliament to fulfil. - The first was 
to give fair play to the Government, constituted of whatever 
party or materials, placed in such a situation... we have given 
them that constitutional support which they^a right, I think, 
in their difficult position, to look forward toL Our second 
part has been at the same time, consistently with'th#line, to 
assert the policy with respect to the matters in question on 
which I believe the gredt majority of the people of this
P
country are decided." - In fact, the Government rarely had 
much difficulty in meeting Opposition criticism in the House" 
of Commons.
The House of Lords was in a rather different position.
^n the first place, the members saw more plearly than the 
Commons the implications of the state of parties in the Lower 
House, and the implications of their own position in the face 
of the strong party majority there. They possessed, too, a
1. Hans. . OCX.1178. ' 2. Ibid.. GGIII.Ô63.
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stronger sense of responsibility than the Commons, and with it 
a feeling that they had a right to discuss the great affairs 
of state when it seemed necessary. Of course^ there were ex­
ceptions. Granville’s particular antagonist in the Lords was 
Cairns, whose attacks on Government policy were a constant 
source of annoyance, but for the most part, the Conservative 
majority in the Lords knew that it was. useless for them to 
move when the party in the Commons was impotent, and debates 
in the Lords could therefore be carried on with greater freedom 
than in the Lower House.
It is curious that the Commons did not seem altogether to
realise the new state of things created by the existence of a
really strong party majority. Private members were aware that
their actions would come to nothing if they were opposed by the
Government. Yet those members on the Liberal side who wished
to raise questions of foreign pàlicy, were somewhat troubled
by the practice of regarding such motions as Votes of Censure.
It was thfe tactic which contributed to Sir Charles d i k e ’s
downfall, and Sir ^il#red Lawson implied that the moving of a
Vote of Censure was an expedient that should be used only in 
I
extreme cases. He certainly did not appreciate that it was
\
to be the stock-in-trade of the strong party government. It 
was a device which the independent member frequently discussed 
thereafter, but which no Committee of Procedure ever found 
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means to counteract, even when Governments reached the stage 
of saying: "If the slightest thing is carried against us -
if we are told to clean the place or to open the windows - , 
we shall be compelled to resign."i
1. T. Lough in evidence before the Committee on Procedure, 1914.
A. & p . (1914), VII., qu.134.
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CONCLUSIONS.
As this investigation has shown, the study of Parlianien— - 
tary influence has a twofold basis* The first is the con­
stitutional question of the general relations between Parlia- 
ment and the Executive, and the second the question of the 
effect of these relations on diplomacy. : As far as the first 
aspect is concerned, it seems that the Parliament of 1868-1874 
was in many ways the first of the modern Parliaments. It was 
based upon a n e w .franchise, of a type which was bound in the 
end to revolutionise the relations between the Executive, 
Parliament, and the electorate, and it was during this adminis­
tration that fears were expressed which have since proved well- 
founded. In 1872, Walter Bagehot feared "that^both ourlpolitical 
parties will bid for the support of the working man; that both 
of them will promise to do as he likes if he will only tell them 
what it is; that as he now holds the casting vote in our affairs, 
both parties will beg and pray him to give that vote to them.
I can conceive of nothing more corrupting or worse for a pet of 
poor ignorant people than that two combinations of well-taught 
and rich men should constantly offer to defer to their decision, 
and compete for the office of executing it. Vox populi will be 
vox diaboli if it is worked in that manner.
1. If.-Bagehot, The English Constitution. 2nd ed. (1872), pp.xxii- 
. xxiii.
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In procedure, this Parliament saw the end of the Address 
procedure, the curtailment of debate on Supply, the growth of 
questions. These three points developed into the character­
istics of the modern procedure, for they represent respectively 
the abandonment of coercion and the disappearance of the Royal 
prerogative, the revolutionising of the financial procedure, 
and the evolution of a new check, as the last bastion of Par­
liamentary independence. The Speaker appointed in the middle 
of the life of this Parliament was the first to be given the 
power of closure - another characteristic of the modern system.
This Parliament, too, was the first which had a modern 
/party majority. This majority enabled the Government to give 
(information and permit debate, without fear of Parliamentary 
: reprisals. They did not even need to give their supporters 
the trouble of walking through the division lobbies, since they 
need only point out that a motion should be withdrawn, other­
wise it would certainly be defeated.
Although a detailed study of the successive Parliamentary 
Committees on Procedure,^which were appointed from time to time 
between 1852 and 1931, is beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
impression gained from them.is that the members at any one time 
did^not realise the changes which were taking place in the » 
position of the House of Commons and the balance of the Con­
stitution. The Parliament of 1863-1874 certainly did not
\1A
realise the extent to which it marked an innovation which was 
to have far-reaching implications. The Government were pro­
bably more aware of the reality of the situation, since they 
were engaged on using the machine and in a better position to 
realise the changes which were taking place in the material 
they had to manipulate.
' To turn to the diplomatic aspect of the question. The" 
opinion was frequently expressed -before the Procedure Commi­
ttees that Parliament, and especially the House of Commons, 
did not take sufficient interest in, or devote sufficient time 
to, questions of foreign policy. * Various suggestions were 
put forward to account for this. Some believed that it was 
simply due to the insular outlook of members, others that it 
was due to a feeling of impotence caused by a knowledge that 
effective intervention was impossible* Bagehot^ took up a 
point made by Bernal Osborne^ and put it down to the working 
of the party system. He maintained that the official Oppo­
sition did not criticise because they knew they would one day 
have to face similar criticism themselves. Thus only inde­
pendent members were free to speak in these matters, and the 
continuity of British foreign policy became an arrangement of 
convenience between the two chief parties. Probably all three 
factors contributed to Parliamentary reticence.
1. Op.cit., p.xilv. 2. Hans.. CCIX.94.
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In any case, the tendency to Ijeave. the conduct of foreign 
affairs to the Executive, which became more marked as the 
century advanced, was already evident in the Parliament of 
1863-1874, although the Lord?, and to a lesser extent the 
Commons also, still occasionally offered criticism. % e n  
they did so, the value of the criticism was reduced by the 
fact that few members had a capacity for thinking in terms of 
diplomatic possibility. The attitude most usually advocated 
was one of firm and open speaking in British dealings with 
other countries, or suggestions that "a shrewd practising 
attorney" should have been sent to make the Treaty of Washing­
ton.^ 7 . \ 1:7.
The Government was very little inclined to listen to or 
accept Parliamentary criticism. Gladstone had a convenient 
illustration to hand for the purpose of combating pleas for 
frankness and Parliamentary discussion. He regularly cited 
the influence of the French Chambers at the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian war, and subsequent events have amply justi­
fied his hesitancy in accepting the intervention of a public 
elected assembly.
There may have been more than coincidence behind the 
occurrvence of several major diplomatic events in the Parlia­
mentary recess. It is impossible to be certain, but in the
1. Hans., CGIX.97. 'V -
case of Central Asia, Granville admitted that he wanted the 
question concluded'hefofe Parliament met.^ Although he can 
scarcely have influenced the date of the Gortchakov Circular, 
the conference was hurried on so as to he in session before 
Parliament reassembled. The Rose mission was also concluded 
in recess. - ■ - 7
The attitude of the permanent staff of the Foreign Office 
seems to have been more formal. This applies particularly 
to the older members. Hammond’s memoranda are full of con­
cern for Parliamentary opinion, and Hertslet, the Librarian, 
was always careful to maintain the strictest constitutional 
precedents when dealing with Parliamentary affairs.^
The attitude of the Ministry itself .seems to have been 
one of unconscious cynicism. When Granville reported Thiers* 
lecture on Parliament to Gladstone, the latter replied: "When
they talk to. us about the House of Commons, there is a reply
1. And was foolish enough to let the statement be printed, Gen- 
tral Asia Ko.l (1873) [C.899], Ko.3, B.C.(1873), LXXV.707.
Gladstone was subsequently challenged on the subject in the 
House of Commons (Hans.. CCXV.SdS).
2. For Hammond, cf. surra, pp.75-8. Hertslet*s attitude is 
exemplified by his reply to a request from the Speaker that 
he should certify the number of copies of a Blue Book to be 
circulated before it was printed: "I fear this order, if 
enforced, will Improductive of very great inconvenience; not 
so much to this office or to the Public, as to the House of 
Commons itself: for it frequently happens that, on the eve 
of an important debate on Foreign Affairs, Papers are laid 
before Parliament by this office in great haste, so that 
members may be put in possession of the correspondence which 
has passed on the Subject before the Debate takes place, but 
if such Papers could not be received in future until the 
Speaker*s sanction had been obtained,and after an official
which but for the proprieties would be best: ’teach your
4
grandmother to suck eggs’." In the face df this light-
!
(hearted confidence it is not surprising that the Government 
did very much as it pleased in matters of foreign policy.
At some points during the negotiations 'connected with the 
Franco-Prussian war the Government’s action seems to have been 
hastened by Parliamentary pressure; but on the whole it cannot 
be maintained that the Parliament of 1868-1874 had any real 
influence upon the policy of the Government.
correspondence had passed on the subject, the object which 
the Secretary of State had in view in presenting the papers 
would be entirely frustrated..." (memo, of 16 June 1872.
F.0.83/329). '
1. Gladstone to Granville, 18 Sept.1870 (G. & D. 29/58, Pte. 
Granville Papers).
(St
APPENDICES.
Appendix I.
ANALYSIS OP DIPLOMATIC BLUE BOOKS RETURNED TO:ADDRESS, 1828-
1914, Ar r a n g e d  b y  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s .
Key to Columns:
A: Date of Administration.
Numbers assigned to the Papers in Temperley and Penson,
A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books.
Total number of Papers laid in each Administration.
Number of 'C* which were Returned to Addresses.
Number of ’D* which were returned to addresses in the Commons
P: Number of *S* which were debated in the Commons.
G: Number of *D* which were returned to addresses in the Lords.
H: Number of *G* which were debated in the Lords.
B:
C:
D:
E:
A.Dates ' B.Nos ' C.Tot D.RA ’ E.HC ' P.Deb ' G.HL ’ H.Deb
1828-30 1G5-182C 30^ 17 15 10 4 4 :
1830-34 183-209 34+ 12 10 3 2 2
1835-41 210-285 118 26 23 10 3 i
1841-46 286-353a 103 19 14 5 5 4 !
1847-52 354-437 150 38 36 2 7 3
1853-58 438-539 164 33 29 2 6 3 j
1858-59 540-557 38 8 8 3 0 0 :
1859-66 558-710 353 100 .  82 11 22 21 j
1866-67 711-749 68 13 13 1 0 0 '
1868-74 750-860a 241 39 35 0 8 7 I
1874-79 861-I005a 310 . 33 32 0 1 0 :
1880-85 1006-1177 446 12 8 0 4 4% i
1886 1178-ll98a 44 0 — —
1887-92 1199-1363 265 14 13 1 1 ‘
1832-95 1364-1419 103 0 . —^ ■ — ■
1835-1200 1420-1558 249 5 5 1 0. 1
1900-05 1559-1695 225 1 1 0 0 0 i
1905-14 1696-I969b 452 5 5 0 0 0 i
Excluding three Papers published in Brit&sh and Foreign State 
Papers. ,
One on a Ministerial motion.
Appendix II.
NOMINAL AND ACTUAL DATES OF CIRCULATION OF BLUE BOOKS.
No. 3E Description Nominal Date Actual Date Evidence
782
782a
0.1(1070) rc.167] , '
.C.(1370),LXX.17-
No 
H 
100.
Franco-Prussian War.
22 Jul 1870 0.25 July 
1870 .
H.C.(
fl4.
.1870)
782b No. 3 (;i870)
H.C.I
220.
,1870}
803 No.l(;i87i)
. H.C.I 
284.
(1871)
10 Aug 1870
Contains des-, 
patches dated: 
25th and had , 
not been re- : 
ceived by HO 
on 25th.(Hans,
c o i n . 880- 1).
Contains d e s - ' 
patch commu- j 
nicated on 
30th. !
Contains des- 
patch sent on  ^
11th. 1
13 Feb 1371 Hans.. CCIV, 
171.
808
Black Sea.
CC.245J, H.0.(1871) 10 Feb 1871 
LXXII.1-114.
Same day )
Gladstone 
!!hçp#d they | 
would be very 
shortly in the 
hands of Mem- ; 
bers" (Hans., , 
GGIV.124)7
Asuerl_can_ Negotiations.
774a N.A.No.1(1870)[C. 10 Feb 1370 14 Feb 1370 Hans., CZCIX,
22], H.G7(1370), 240.
LXIX.439-62.
* These are the numbers assigned to the papers in Temperley and 
Penson, A Century of Diplomatic Blue Books:
I SI
No. Description Nominal Date Actual Date Evidence
822b
822c
K.A. 1:0 .3 (1372) to. 
505], II.C. (1372), 
LXIX.331-6.
E.A.Eo.4(1072) to. 
505], H (0.(1372), 
LXIX.337-433.
1228 E.A.Eo. 5(1372) [0. 
523],' 2.0.(1372), 
LXIX.629-33.
I22ij E.A.Eo.9(1372) CO. 
566], H.0.(1872), 
LXIX.709-62. -
15 Apr 1072? Possibly 18' Hans., OCX,
1330.
IS Apr 1872 Possibly 17 Statements 
on 13th that 
it would be 
circulated 
"tomorrow" 
(Hans.. OCX. 
1330,1335).
18 Apr 1372' 16 Apr 1872 Hans.. GGX.
1330.
14 Jun 1372 Same day, 
Gladstone 
hoped they 
would be 
circulated 
before the 
next meeting 
of the House 
(Hans..GGXI. 
1742).
Appendix III. ,
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON SOME MEÈBERS OF PARLIAMENT.
The- purpose of these notes is to indicate the background and 
interests of private members of the House of Commons mentioned 
in the text. No attempt has been made to give full biogra­
phies. Except in a few cases indicated below, the sources 
used are Dod, Parliamentary Companion, and the Dictionary of 
National Biography. The constituency and party given after 
the name are those which applied in 1863 or on first entering 
the House after that date. In a few cases where these details 
changed during the administration this is indicated at the 
appropriate point in the member’s career. Dates of seats held 
are not given. Where a full-length biography is known to 
exist it is cited with reference to each member.
mentioned on pp.
ADDEHLEY, Sir Charles (N.Staffs, Cons.) 74
1814-1905. Entered Parliament 1841;
President of Bd. of Health and V'te: -
President of Bd* of Bduc. 1858-9; Un­
dersecretary for Colonies 1866-8;
President of Bd. of Trade 1874 till
his retirement in 1878 when he was • 
raised to the peerage as 1st Baron 
Norton.
Biog.: W.S.C.Pemberton, Life of Lord Norton.
AXTOUK, R.Sinclair (Kirkcaldy', Lit.) 120n., 122
b. 1823. Entered Parliament 1862.
;
BEAUMONT, Somerset Archibald (Wakefield, 106
Lib.)
b. 1835. Entered Parliament 1860.
Had been supporter of Palmerston’s 
foreign policy. Brother of Wentworth 
Blackett Beaumont, M.P. for Northum­
berland S.
BOÜVEHIE, E.Pleydell (Kilmarnock, Lib.) 93
1818-89. Precis-writer to Lord Pal­
merston Jan.-June 1840; called to Bar
mentioned on pp.
1843; entered Parliament 1844; Under- 
Seo. Home Office 1850-2; Chairman of 
Committees 1853-5; Vi’c.a-"— President 
of Bd. of Trade Mar.-Aug.1855; Presi­
dent of Poor Law Bd. 1855-8.
2nd son of Earl of Radnor. A Liberal 
of the "old whig school" (P.N.B.) and 
frequent disagreements with Gladstone 
resulted in complete break in Mar.1873.
Corresponded with the Times over the 
initials E.P.B.
BULWER, Sir William Henry Lytton Earle (Tamworth, 97,106,l07n. 
Lib.)
1801-72. Attached to Mission to Berlin 
1827-3; at Vienna 1829-30; at the Hague 
1830. Entered Parliament 1830; elected 
for Coventry as "advanced Liberal" 1831; 
attached to Mission at Paris 1832; sec­
retary of legation at Brussels and M.P. 
for Marylebone as "radical reformer"
1835-7; secretary of embassy at Constan­
tinople 1837-3; at Paris 1839-40; Amb. 
at Madrid 1843-9; at Washington 1849-52; 
at Tuscany 1852; at Constantinople 1859- 
65; M.P. for Tamworth.1865 until raised 
to peerage as Baron Balling and Bulwer,
21 Mar.1871.
BURY, Viscount (Berwick-on-Tweed, Lib.) 93
1832-94. Priv.Sec. to Lord John Russell 
1850-1; entered Parliament 1857; Treas. 
of Household 1859-66; became Conservative 
1875; Raised to peerage as Baron Ashford 
1876; Under“ Sec. at War 1878-30 and 1880- 
85; succeeded his father as Earl of Albe­
marle 1891.
CORRANCE, F.S. (E.Suffolk, Cons.) .. 7
b. 1822. Entered Parliament 1867.
DILICE, Sir Charles Wentworth (Chelsea, Rad.) 59,62,63,84
1843-1911. Entered Parliament 1868; (and n.),66n.
Under-Sec. for Foreign Affairs 1880-2; 121,125
Pres, of Local Gvmt. Bd.; in retirement 
owing to divorce case 1886-92; re-elected
HI
mentioned on pp.
for Forest of Dean 1892 and held the 
seat until his death.
• ' A Republican, and though a radical,
"a convinced and well-informed im­
perialist" -(D.H.B) . The author Af 
Greater Britain and other pamphlets*
He favoured a policy of ^non-inter­
vention in foreign politics" (Dod).
Biog.; Gwynn and Tuckwell, Life of Sir 
Charles Dilke.. •
DIXON, George (Birmingham, Lib.) 81
1820-98. Mayor of Birmingham 1866.
Entered Parliament for Birmingham 
1867.
, An "advanced Liberal" (Dod).
EASTICECK, Edward Backhouse (Penrhyn, Lib.- 66(and n.).
Cons.) 7 " - llBn.
1814-83. Asst.-Sec. to India Office 
1858-60; Sec. of Legation, Persia,
1860-2; Charge d ’Aff. Thhran, Dec, "
1862-Jan.23,1863; Priv.Sec. to Cran- 
borne 1866-7. Entered Parliament 
- 1868, retired 1874...
■1 ' ' a '-
FAWCETT, Henry (Brighton, Lib.) ' 106
1833-84, Professor of Polit.Econ.,
Cambridge, 1863-84; entered Parlia­
ment 1865; ceased to receive Liberal 
whip 1868; P.M.G. 1880-4.
He was blind throughout his Parlia- ’
mentary career. Known as "Member 
for India".
Biog.: Leslie Stephen, Life of Henry Fawcett,
1885. 7. ; ' '  - .- - ^
GILPIN, Charles (Northampton Bor., Lib.) 106
b,18l5; entered Parliament 1857;
Pari.Sec. to Poor Law Bd. 1859-65.
TSn "earnest and thorough Liberal"
(Dod).
GOLDSHID, Sir Francis H. (Heading, Lib.) 80
1803-78. Entered Parliament i860.
Q.c. :
141
mentioned on pp
■ in Sybil. ’Waldersbare* in Endymion. 
Biog.: Charles Whibley, Life of Lord John 
- Manners.^ . ,
NORTHCOTE, Sir Stafford Henry (N.Devon, Cons.)
1818-87. Entered Parliament 1855; Fin. 
Sec. to Treasury 1859; Pres, of Bd. of 
Trade 1366-7; Sec. of State for India 
1367-8; Member of Washington Commission 
1871; Chanc. of Exch. 1874-80; Leader 
of Opposition 1880-5; First Lord of 
Treasury (not P.M.) 1885. Raised to 
peerage as 1st Earl of IddZesleigh,
6 July 1385. Foreign Sec. 1886.
Biog.; Andrew Lang, Life of the Earl of : 
IddZesleigh. 1890.
O ’BRIEN, Sir Patrick (Kings Co., Cons.)
b.l823; entered Parliament 1852.
OSBORNE, Ralph Bernal (Waterford, Lib.) ' • 
1808-82. Entered Parliament 1841;
Sec. to Admiralty 1857-8.
A "licensed jester" (T.B.Atla^, Lives 
of the Victorian Chancellors. ii.304).
74
106
63,64(and n . ), 
80,93,94,95, 
106,107,109, 
117.
PEEL, Sir Robert {3rd Bart.) (Tamworth, Lib.)
1822-95. Attache at Madrid; Sec. of 
Legation, Switzerland, 1346; Charge 
d ’Aff. Switzerland 1846-50. Entered 
Parliament 1850; Lord of Admiralty 
1855-7; Sec. for Ireland 1861-5. 
LibTCons. 1850-5; Lib. 1855-74; Libr 
Cons. 1874-80; Cons, from 1880.
"The want of moral fibre in his volatile 
character, an absence of dignity, and an 
inability to accept a fixed political 
creed, prevented him from acquiring the 
confidence, of his associates or of the 
public" (D.N.B.).
RYLANDS, Peter (Warrington, Rad.)
1820-87, Mayor of Warrington 1853-4;
63,113.
34,82,120-1,
123
entered Parliament 1868.
Biog.; L.Gordon Rylands, Correspondence 
IS of Peter Rylands.
and
1*2.
mentioned on pp.
8ELWIN-IBBETS0N, Sir Henry John (W.Essez, Cons.) 5
1825-1902, Entered Parliament 1865; 
Under-Sec. to Home Office 1874-8; Pari,
Sec. to Treas. 1878-86; raised to peerage 
as 1st Baron Hookwood 1892.
WAffEEBOTHAM, Henry Selfe Page (Stroud, Lib.) 6
1837-73. -Entered Parliament 1867;
Under-Sec. to Home Office 1871 until his 
death.
Liberal but sat below the gangway. Leader 
of nonconformists in the House of Commons.
T7YNDHAM, Hon. Percy Scawen (W.Cumberland, Cons.) 93
1835-1911. Entered Parliament 1860.
2nd son of 1st Lord Leconfield.
mBIBLIOGRAPHY.
■ Note»
A list of sources arranged in the conventional manner 
cannot describe the use made of them, or the methods.nece­
ssary, in a study of this kind. It is therefore proposed 
to describe the manner in which the material has been used, 
and then to append a classified list.
As the whole study divides into Parliamentary and diplo­
matic sections, the material will be discussed in the same 
way, beginning with the former. Erskine M a y ’s Parliamentary 
Practice is the essential technical handbook for a Parliamen­
tary study. It is not a secondary work in a strict sense.
A  distinction must be made between the contemporary and later 
editions. The contemporary editions, that is the seventh 
and eighth, represent the manual of procedure actually in use 
in the House at the time of this Parliament. The later edi­
tions, especially the most recent, the fourteenth, are more 
valuable as histories of procedure. The actual rules of 
procedure of the House can be found in the Standing Orders, 
printed in the Journals and periodically bAund as separate 
volumes.
The information on procedure given by Erskine May can be 
supplemented from the reports of, and evidence given before, 
the Select Committees on Procedure appointed from time to time. 
The most important of these Committees from a general point of
view were those appointed in I3l4 and 1331.- - These contain 
a certain amount of historical material, while the others are 
chiefly valuable as giving the background to changes in pro­
cedure. None of them are particularly reliable §ts to facts.
The general constitutional histories are not particularly 
valuable-for this type of study. They are not usually suffi­
ciently detailed. Though they commonly realise that practice 
is governed by custom as well as by definite rule, they do not 
allow for the extent to which even custom is variable. This 
•can only be worked out by reference to what actually happened. 
The most useful are J. Redlich, Procedure of the House of 
Commons. Alpheus Todd, Constitutional History of England, and 
the contemporary history, Walter Bagehot, The English Consti­
tution.
The Journals of both Houses', which are the authentic re­
cord of Parliamentary action, are of little use for this pur­
pose because they record simply the actions and not the opi­
nions of Parliament. Hansard is. of course, the primary 
source for this study, but it should be noted that at this 
period it was not always accurate. It is clear from the de­
bates that members at the time relied on the Times reports, 
but since these are too cumbersome to use for the purposes of 
detailed study they can only be employed to check or supplement 
Hansard.
The basis for the study of the diplomatic aspect of the 
question, and also the link between the two sections, is pro­
vided by Teraperley and Penson, A Century of Diplomatic Blue 
Books. This work is invaluable as an index to Blue Books, 
particularly since the general indexes to Parliamentary Papers 
are inconvenient for purposes of reference. It contains pre­
fatory n&tes which offer a useful initiation into the Parlia­
mentary aspects of each administration, and to the Blue Book 
policy of successive Governments.
The Blue Books have to be used in conjunction with Foreign 
Office material because this material is primarily of importance 
for this study in as far as it is omitted from Blue Books. The 
private correspondence of the Foreign Secretaries with British 
representatives abroad and foreign ambassadors in London have 
also been studied from this point of view, but in general the 
private papers of Clarendon, Granville, and Gladstone have been 
primarily useful in throwing light on their attitude to Parlia­
ment. The biographies of Lyons, Granville, and Gladstone have 
served the same purpose.
Apart from the constitutional histories already mentioned, 
and the valuable monographs listed below, there is very little 
secondary material of any significance. Although many authors 
have purported to deal with this field, their work - though 
sometimes stimulating - has usually not been based on detailed 
research and is correspondingly less useful.
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